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THE IRRELEVANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS
David A. Strauss*
Article V of the Constitution specifies how the Constitution may be amended. Notwith-
standing all the attention that constitutional amendments receive, however, our
constitutional order would look little different if a formal amendment process did not
exist. At least since the first few decades of the Republic, constitutional amendments
have not been an important means by which the Constitution, in practice, has changed.
Many changes have come about without amendments. In some instances, even though
amendments were rejected, the law changed in the way the failed amendments sought.
Several amendments that were thought to be important in fact had little effect until
society changed by other means. Other amendments did little more than ratify changes
that had already come about in other ways. If this thesis is correct, it suggests that
precedents and other traditions are often as important as the text of the amended
Constitution; that political activity, in general, should not focus on proposed
constitutional amendments; and that American constitutional law is best seen as the
result of a complex, evolutionary process, rather than of discrete, self-consciously
political acts by a sovereign People.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS
A. What Amendments Do
At the time our Constitution was drafted, written constitutions
were in many ways a new idea. The idea of a formal amendment pro-
cess was, therefore, also new.' Article V specifies various ways in
* Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. This article had its inception
in the Wilber Katz Memorial Lecture at the University of Chicago Law School, entitled "Does It
Matter If We Amend the Constitution?" Many members of the audience on that occasion gave me
helpful comments on the lecture. Michael Klarman provided very helpful comments at an early
stage of the project. I am also grateful to Michael Dorf, Richard Fallon, Jack Goldsmith, Richard
Posner, Geoffrey Stone, Adrian Vermeule, Keith Whittington, and participants in workshops at the
University of Virginia, New York University, and Benjamin N. Cardozo Law Schools for com-
ments on earlier drafts, and to Laura Grisolano, Crista Leahy, and Wesley Brown for comments
and research assistance. I thank the Jerome F. Kutak Faculty Fund, the Lee and Brena Freeman
Faculty Fund, and the Sonnenschein Fund at the University of Chicago Law School for financial
support.
I On the complex question of the ways in which the idea of a written constitution was an
American innovation, see generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 67-69, 175-84, 189-93 (enlarged ed. 1992); and GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 259-68 (1998).
At the time of the Constitutional Convention in 1787, five states' constitutions had no provi-
sion for formal amendment. The others specified various means: legislative action of some form,
conventions, or, in two states, a "council of censors" elected by cities and counties that would peri-
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which the Constitution can be changed without the unanimous consent
of the states, and in the ratification debates the supporters of the Con-
stitution frequently mentioned the relative ease of amendment in urg-
ing the superiority of the new Constitution to the Articles of Confed-
eration.2  Latter-day successors to the Founders have also been
enthusiastic about the Article V process: members of the most recent
Congress proposed sixty-nine amendments, addressing more than six-
teen subjects.3
It is certainly natural to think, as all these efforts suggest, that Ar-
ticle V sets out the principal way of changing the Constitution. The
Supreme Court undoubtedly thought it was uttering a truism when it
said: "Nothing new can be put into the Constitution except through the
amendatory process. Nothing old can be taken out without the same
process."'4 But in fact, through most of our history, the amendment
process has not been an important means of constitutional change.
The Constitution, in practice, changes in many ways - but not be-
cause a supermajority makes a discrete, self-conscious decision to
amend its text. On the contrary, the forces that bring about constitu-
odically determine if the Constitution should be revised. See WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTI-
TUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 139-44 (Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., Univ. of
N.C. Press I98o) (1973).
2 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 246-47 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., I961);
THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, at 492-94 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also 4
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 176-77 (Ayer Co. 1987) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1888) (statement of Mr. Iredell in the
North Carolina ratification debates).
The Articles of Confederation could be amended only by the unanimous consent of the
states: "[N]or shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of [the Articles]; unless such
alteration be agreed to in a congress of the united states, and be afterwards confirmed by the legis-
latures of every state." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII (U.S. 178).
Article V of the Constitution provides:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of
two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments,
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitu-
tion, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Con-
ventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be
proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the
Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and
fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its
Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
George Washington, in his Farewell Address, listed the fact that the Constitution "contain[s] within
itself a provision for its own amendment" as one of the principal reasons that the Constitution "has
a just claim to your confidence and your support." George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept.
17, 1796), in i A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 205, 209
(James D. Richardson ed., 1897) [hereinafter Washington's Farewell Address].
3 See Search of THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/dio6query.html (Jan. 23, 2001) (search for
joint resolutions containing "constitutional amendment" in Subject Term field).
4 Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956).
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tional change work their will almost irrespective of whether and how
the text of the Constitution is changed.
Many people have observed that our system has other ways of
changing besides formal amendments: court decisions, important leg-
islation, or the gradual accretion of power, as in the Presidency during
the twentieth century. But these are not just other ways in which the
Constitution changes. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that these
are the only means of change we have.
To be precise: a case can be made that, subject to only a few quali-
fications, our system would look the same today if Article V of the
Constitution had never been adopted and the Constitution contained
no provision for formal amendment. Of course this claim involves a
degree of counterfactual speculation and cannot be proved with cer-
tainty: if the Constitution really contained no provision for formal
amendment, much else about the way constitutional law has developed
might be different.5 And there are some qualifications and arguable
exceptions to this proposition. But even taking into account all the
qualifications and exceptions, there is a clear pattern: constitutional
amendments have not been an important means of changing the con-
stitutional order.
I will try to prove this thesis by establishing four propositions.
First - a relatively familiar point - sometimes matters addressed by
the Constitution change even though the text of the Constitution is un-
changed. Second, and more dramatically, some constitutional changes
occur even though amendments that would have brought about those
very changes are explicitly rejected. Third, when amendments are
adopted, they often do no more than ratify changes that have already
taken place in society without the help of an amendment. The
changes produce the amendment, rather than the other way around.
Fourth, when amendments are adopted even though society has not
changed, the amendments are systematically evaded. They end up
having little effect until society catches up with the ambitions of the
amendment.
This argument presupposes that there is a difference between what
might be called the small-"c" constitution - the fundamental political
institutions of a society, or the constitution in practice - and the
document itself. This distinction (about which I say more below) is
imprecise, but it is both coherent and useful.6 When people try to
5 On some of the issues raised by historical counterfactuals, see generally Niall Ferguson, In-
troduction: Virtual History: Towards a 'Chaotic' Theory of the Past, in VIRTUAL HISTORY i (Niall
Ferguson ed., 1998).
6 Many others have drawn a similar distinction. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLE-
MENTING THE CONSTITUTION ch. 7 (forthcoming 2001); Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has
the United States Constitution Been Amended? (A) <26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) >27: Accounting for
1459
HeinOnline  -- 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1459 2000-2001
HARVARD LAWREVIEW
amend the Constitution - that is, the document - they are not ulti-
mately concerned about the document; they are concerned about the
institutional arrangements that the document is supposed to control.
If those institutions do not change, then the constitution in practice -
the small-"c" constitution, which I also call the constitutional order or
the constitutional regime - has not changed, even if the text of the
Constitution has changed. Similarly, as I discuss below, it is coherent
to say (as people often do) that certain changes are of a kind and mag-
nitude that amount to changes in the constitutional order even though
the text remains the same. The proposition I am considering is that
amendments to the text of the Constitution have been, at most, periph-
eral to the process of change in the constitutional regime - to the
point that the small-"c" constitution would look the same even if there
were no provision for formal amendment of the text.
Two qualifications are in order. First, I consider this claim about
the irrelevance of the amendment process in the context of a mature
democratic society, not a fledgling constitutional order. It is a claim
about how a constitutional system changes, not about how one be-
comes established in the first place. For that reason I do not try to ar-
gue that the first twelve amendments to our Constitution made no dif-
ference, although such an argument may be stronger than it appears to
be at first. The Constitution of 1787 built on a system that was al-
ready well established in many ways, and it might be possible to argue
that the text of the original Constitution and the early amendments
were relatively insignificant, compared to forces already operating in
society, just as (I argue) the later textual amendments were relatively
insignificant.
Be that as it may, when a constitutional system is first getting un-
derway and making its shakedown voyage, so to speak, amendments
are more properly seen as part of the initial establishment of the re-
gime, rather than as a means of changing it. 7 When a regime is being
established, formal texts are more important; the traditions, institu-
Constitutional Change, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 13, 18 (Sanford Levinson ed., i995); see also Thomas C. Grey, Do
We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 707-08 (1075). The point has been
made less recently as well. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES 43-45 (New York, G.P. Putman's Sons 18go).
7 The Twelfth Amendment is an example of a provision that corrected problems that became
apparent only after the "shakedown voyage." Once George Washington retired, political parties
emerged in full force, and the method of electing the President prescribed in the original Constitu-
tion became unworkable. See, e.g., TADAHISA KURODA, THE ORIGINS OF THE TWELFTH
AMENDMENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1787-1804, at 172-73
(1994). The Twelfth Amendment might conceivably be treated as a "rule of the road" - an ad-
justment that could have been made by legislation even had the formal amendment process been
unavailable, see infra Part IV, pp. 1486-89 - but it seems better to treat it as part of the establish-
ment of the new political system.
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tions, and understandings that bind a mature society together, and that
make orderly change possible without formal amendments, are less
well developed. But once a constitutional system has survived for, say,
a generation or two, formal constitutional amendments of the kind Ar-
ticle V envisions become incidental to the main processes of constitu-
tional change.8
The second qualification is that constitutional amendments do
serve certain ancillary functions. For example, several constitutional
amendments have played the familiar role of establishing "rules of the
road" - settling matters that are not themselves controversial but that
must be settled clearly, one way or another. The Twenty-fifth Amend-
ment, which spells out what to do if a President is disabled, is an ex-
ample. This is not a trivial function, but it is far from central to the
process of constitutional change, and it probably does not require a
formal amendment procedure. If a formal amendment process were
unavailable, it seems likely that our system would develop some other
way of settling these issues, at least in most cases.
Constitutional amendments also serve the distinct function of sup-
pressing outliers. When the nation has reached a nearly universal con-
sensus on a subject, the formal amendment process is a way of bring-
ing the stragglers into line. It turns all-but-unanimity into unanimity.
The Twenty-fourth Amendment, which bans poll taxes in federal elec-
tions, is an example: by the time it was adopted, only five states had
poll taxes.9 In this way, constitutional amendments do cause changes,
but changes around the edges, as it were, rather than at the core.
This relatively minor function, too, may be even less significant
than it appears. In each of these instances, the outliers might not have
held out much longer against the nearly unanimous opposing consen-
sus even if there had been no constitutional amendment. And again it
seems reasonable to conjecture that, if there were no formal amend-
ment process at all, the courts would allow Congress greater power to
act in areas in which the national consensus was strong. As I discuss
below, on at least two occasions - during the New Deal and during
the civil rights era - a strong national consensus led to expansions in
congressional power, even without a formal amendment - once even
after an amendment formally authorizing the change was explicitly re-
jected. Legislation, rather than constitutional amendments, suppressed
the outliers. Probably the most accurate description of amendments
8 Along the same lines, I have argued elsewhere that the entire text of the Constitution (in-
cluding the amendments) plays a limited role in the development of constitutional law in a mature
democratic society. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 877, 87-91 (1996).
9 DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION,
1776-1995, at 356 (1996).
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that suppress outliers, then, is that they allow near-unanimity to be-
come unanimity a little sooner than would otherwise have happened.
Again this is a far cry from serving as the principal engine of constitu-
tional change.
B. Why Don't Amendments Matter?
On reflection, perhaps it should not be so surprising that a formal,
supermajoritarian amendment process matters so little in a mature
constitutional regime. One characteristic of a mature liberal society is
that there are ways other than formal amendments adopted by a su-
permajority to change the Constitution in fact if not in name. Those
other mechanisms exist because over time people have developed insti-
tutions that they trust. By contrast, in a fledgling society that lacks
well-established understandings, traditions, and patterns of mutual
trust and accommodation, the formal, written text may be the only us-
able institution.
In this respect, a mature society might be compared to a long-term
contractual agreement. 10 The parties to such contracts often do not
rely solely, or even substantially, on the text of the contract to govern
their day-to-day relationship; they have developed extratextual under-
standings. Similarly, in a mature society, people accept the acts of leg-
islatures, courts, and executive agencies - and the political and non-
political acts of their fellow citizens - even when those acts augment
or arguably conflict with the foundational text. In a newly formed po-
litical society, any apparent deviation from the words of a constitution
might be seen as revolutionary and might cause the society to break
apart; in a mature society, relationships and patterns of trust are so
well developed that that does not happen.
As a result, by the time an Article V supermajority is galvanized
into action, chances are good that much of society has already changed
by one of these other means. And if a formal amendment process were
unavailable, society would find another way to enforce the change it
has determined to make - by legislation and judicial interpretation,
or by alterations in social understandings and private sector behavior.
The change might not be accomplished as neatly or as decisively; out-
liers might not be brought into line as quickly, for example. But rela-
tively speaking, that is a detail. Those other institutions - not su-
permajoritarian constitutional amendments - will be the truly
important means of constitutional change. This explains why, when
10 See generally Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Un-
der Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854 0978); Ian R.
Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 340, 382-89 (1983).
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society has changed enough to produce a supermajority in favor of a
formal amendment, the amendment is probably unnecessary.
One cannot, however, just say simplistically that any set of political
forces strong enough to bring about a constitutional amendment is
strong enough to change society in some other way, because that is not
always true. A supermajority might act, and adopt an amendment,
even if society has not fundamentally changed. An amendment might
represent a momentary high-water mark of popular sentiment on a
question, or an effective effort by an interest group at the height of its
power to secure its position." At a later time, many people, even a
majority, might decide that the amendment was a mistake - but there
it is, entrenched in the Constitution.
On these occasions the formal amendment will be relatively insig-
nificant for a different reason. When there is no lasting social consen-
sus behind a textual amendment, the change in the text of the Consti-
tution is unlikely to make a lasting difference - at least if it seeks to
affect society in an important way - unless society changes in the way
that the amendment envisions. Until that happens, the amendment is
likely to be evaded, or interpreted in a way that blunts its effective-
ness. This is, in a sense, the other side of the fact that a mature society
has a variety of institutions, in addition to the text of the Constitution,
that can affect how the society operates. Those institutions can change
society without changing the Constitution; but they can also keep soci-
ety basically the same - perhaps with some struggle, but still basically
the same - even if the text of the Constitution changes. This was,
most notoriously, the story of the Fourteenth and, especially, the Fif-
teenth Amendment. The Fifteenth Amendment was somewhat effec-
tive in the short run, but within a generation it had been reduced to a
nullity in the South. 1
2
It does not follow that, owing to some kind of historical necessity,
formal amendments cannot ever cause important changes. Rather the
point is that the formal amendment process will be the means of sig-
nificant change only in certain limited circumstances that hardly ever
occur in a mature society. In particular, three conditions must be pres-
ent for the amendment process to make a difference.
11 See Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic
Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. III, 122 (1993). Bou-
dreaux and Pritchard seem too unequivocal, however, in predicting that a group will always, or
generally, seek a constitutional amendment when it believes its strength is at its highest point. See,
e.g., id. at 123. If (as I argue) formal constitutional amendments are neither necessary nor suffi-
cient to bring about lasting change, a group might be better advised to devote its resources else-
where: to judicial appointments, to establishing bureaucratic institutions that will continue to
promote the group's interests, or to nonpolitical activity that alters society in a way that effectively
determines future political decisions.
12 See infra p. 1483.
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First, a formal supermajoritarian amendment process is unlikely to
be an important means of change unless the other usual means of
change, such as legislation and judicial interpretation, are unavailable
for some reason.' 3 If other means of change are available, they will
probably have effected the change to a significant degree before a su-
permajority can be assembled to amend the Constitution.
Second, a formal amendment process is likely to make a difference
only when the supermajority that adopts the amendment is a tempo-
rary one that was assembled even though society had not fundamen-
tally changed. Deep, enduring changes in society will find some way
to establish themselves with or without a formal amendment - if not
through legislation or changes in the composition of the courts, then
through changes in private behavior. The formal amendment process
will have its most significant effect when the supermajority sentiment
does not persist.
Finally, for an amendment to matter, it must be unusually difficult
to evade. An amendment that specifies a precise rule, for example, is
more likely to have an effect than one that establishes only a relatively
vague norm. If its text is at all imprecise, an amendment that is
adopted at the high-water mark of public sentiment will be prone to
narrow construction or outright evasion once public sentiment recedes,
as the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were.
If all these circumstances occur together, a temporary supermajor-
ity's ability to adopt a formal amendment might bring about a perma-
nent change that would not have occurred without the formal amend-
ment. But this confluence of conditions is unlikely to happen very
often. I suggest below one instance in which it might have happened
- the Twenty-second Amendment, which limits presidents to two
terms. Even that example is not entirely clear. But that may be the
only occasion since the early days of the Republic when the formal
amendment process seems to have made a substantial difference.
C. The Significance of Insignificance
This claim about the insignificance of the formal amendment pro-
cess, if it is true, matters for several reasons. The first is that it un-
dermines a popular way of thinking about the Constitution - that the
written Constitution is in some meaningful sense the work of a delib-
erate act, or a series of discrete acts, by We the People.' 4 The Consti-
13 On how the existence of alternative means of constitutional change makes amendments less
likely, see Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO IM-
PERFECTION, supra note 6, at 245-46.
14 See, e.g., Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, The Politics of Constitutional Revision in
Eastern Europe, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 6, at 275, 276 (stating that "[t]he
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tution claims to speak in the name of "the People," 15 and a central as-
pect of the constitutional thought of the founding era was that written
constitutions derive their authority from the people, not from elected
representatives or any other source. 16 It is natural to think of the for-
mal amendments to the Constitution in the same way. The People,
one might say, do not speak often; they spoke comprehensively in 1789,
and on certain specific subjects in the subsequent amendments. But
on those occasions when they do speak, their voice carries special
authority. Constitutional amendments, on this view, are such occa-
sions. Because a constitutional amendment is supported by a super-
majority, unlike an ordinary statute, it reflects a decisive act by the
people. George Washington spoke of constitutional amendments this
way.
17
However appropriate this view might be as an account of the Con-
stitution at the founding, it no longer matches the reality of our consti-
tutional order, and it may not match the reality of any mature liberal
constitutional system. The constitutional principles that actually gov-
ern a mature society accumulate and evolve over time through a vari-
ety of complex means.18 Discrete, decisive, formal amendatory acts,
supposedly by the sovereign People, are at most a minor part of the
process of constitutional change. 19
traditional democratic answer" to the question of the source of "the constitutionally regulated
power to revise constitutional regulations of power" is "'the people'").
15 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
16 See WOOD, supra note i, at 372-89.
17 See Washington's Farewell Address, supra note 2, at 212 ("If in the opinion of the people the
distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be cor-
rected by an amendment in the way which the Constitution designates."); Letter from George
Washington to Bushrod Washington (Nov. io, 1787), in 29 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHING-
TON 309, 311 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939) ("The warmest friends and the best supporters the
Constitution has, do not contend that it is free from imperfections; but they found them unavoid-
able and are sensible, if evil is likely to arise there from, the remedy must come hereafter; ... and,
as there is a Constitutional door open for it, I think the People (for it is with them to Judge) can as
they will have the advantage of experience on their Side, decide with as much propriety on the al-
terations and amendments which are necessary .... "); cf Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s],
Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, o6 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 161-62 (1996)
(quoting Lincoln's First Inaugural Address and concluding that Lincoln saw Article V as the only
avenue for constitutional amendment).
For an argument that the framers and ratifiers of Article V saw amendments not at all as a
means of bringing about change, but rather just as a way to "perfect" the Constitution by correct-
ing defects, see Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution's Accommodation of Social Change, 88
MICH. L. REV. 239, 300-01 (1989).
18 For a defense of this claim, see Strauss, supra note 8.
19 Even if formal amendatory acts are not the principal means of constitutional change, consti-
tutional change might still be the product of discrete, self-consciously political acts by the popula-
tion, and not of an evolutionary process. The central argument of I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (199I), and 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS
(1998), is that certain discrete, self-consciously political acts by the population should be viewed as
having changed the Constitution, even if they did not take the form prescribed in Article V. My
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There are-also more concrete implications that follow from the rela-
tive insignificance of the formal amendment process. It is sometimes
said that the Constitution should be interpreted "as a whole." The
amendments and the original provisions should, according to this view,
all be read together, roughly as if the document were all written at one
time by one author.2 0 For example, many of the amendments concern
the franchise and elections; few of the post-Bill of Rights amendments
establish new substantive rights. Therefore (the argument runs), con-
stitutional law should be concerned primarily with maintaining a well-
functioning representative government rather than with establishing
substantive rights. 2 1 Others have invoked the Nineteenth Amend-
ment, which guarantees women's suffrage, as a reason for interpreting
the Fourteenth Amendment to forbid gender discrimination across the
board (an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that appears
inconsistent with the original understanding of that provision).2 2 Still
others have suggested that the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth
Amendments (authorizing an income tax, providing for the direct elec-
conjecture is that the same factors that prevent supermajoritarian textual amendments from being
a significant means of change also make it unlikely that discrete, self-consciously political acts by
the People that do not take the form of textual amendments will be an important means of change.
But this is only a conjecture at this point (and it does not address Ackerman's normative argument
that only certain actions by popular majorities can justify constitutional change). For another ac-
count of punctuated (rather than continuously evolutionary) extratextual constitutional change, see
generally KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (i999).
20 For an impressive example of this approach, see generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism,
112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (i999). There are also suggestions of this approach in RONALD DWORKIN,
FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 7-12 (i996); in
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 361-63, 379-99 (1986); and perhaps in Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, ioo HARV. L. REV. II89,
1189-93, 1237-51 (1987). For a trenchant criticism of this approach to interpretation, see Adrian
Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, I 13
HARV. L. REV. 730 (2ooo).
21 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 90-
i01 (1980).
22 For an example of this use of the Nineteenth Amendment, see Michael C. Dorf, Integrating
Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J.
1765, 1778-79 (1997). Cf AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECON-
STRUCTION 274 (i998) (arguing that the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments should be read
together to guarantee women the right to serve on juries).
Justice Sutherland made an argument of this kind in his opinion for the Court in the
Lochner-era case of Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923):
[T]he ancient inequality of the sexes, otherwise than physical, as suggested in [Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (i9o8)] has continued "with diminishing intensity." In view of the
great - not to say revolutionary - changes which have taken place since [Muller], in the
contractual, political and civil status of women, culminating in the Nineteenth Amend-
ment, it is not unreasonable to say that these differences have now come almost, if not
quite, to the vanishing point.
Id. at 553. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), overruled Adkins. Id. at 400.
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tion of Senators, and enfranchising women, respectively) implicitly
authorized the federal welfare and regulatory state.1
3
These arguments presuppose that amending the Constitution -
and, by implication, failing to amend the Constitution - is a signifi-
cant event. If this supposition is true, a formal, textual amendment
might legitimately be read back into other provisions of the Constitu-
tion to produce a result that would not be warranted without the for-
mal amendment.2 4 But if the amendments carry no special signifi-
cance - if they are not the principal means (or even an important
means) by which the People change our constitutional order - then
these interpretive approaches lose their foundation. It may be correct
to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to forbid gender discrimina-
tion, and the movement toward greater equality for women, including
women's suffrage, may be a legitimate reason to interpret the Four-
teenth Amendment this way. But the fact that women's suffrage was
formally recognized by the Nineteenth Amendment - instead of
coming about through, for example, state legislation or judicial inter-
pretation - should not carry great weight.
One final implication is the most practical of all. If amendments
are in fact a sidelight, then it will usually be a mistake for people con-
cerned about an issue to try to address it by amending the Constitu-
tion. Their resources are generally better spent on legislation, litiga-
tion, or private-sector activities. It is true that the effort to obtain a
constitutional amendment may serve very effectively as a rallying
point for political activity. A constitutional amendment may be an es-
pecially powerful symbol, and it may be worthwhile for a group to
seek an amendment for just that reason. But in this respect constitu-
tional amendments are comparable to congressional resolutions, presi-
dential proclamations, or declarations of national holidays. If they
bring about change, they do so because of their symbolic value, not
because of their operative legal effect.
The claim that constitutional amendments under Article V are not
a principal means of constitutional change is a claim about the rela-
tionship between supermajoritarian amendments and fundamental,
constitutional change. It should not be confused with the very differ-
ent claim that judicial decisions cannot make significant changes with-
out help from Congress or the President;25 and it certainly should not
23 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 22, at 300.
24 See id. (suggesting that "ordinary citizens and lawyers alike" may find such an inference
from a textual amendment more acceptable than a claim that the Constitution had changed with-
out a textual amendment).
21 See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (199 i); Symposium, Twentieth-Century Constitutional History, 8o VA. L. REV. I
('994).
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be confused with a global skepticism about the efficacy of political ac-
tivity generally. The point is that changes of constitutional magnitude
- changes in the small-"c" constitution - are not brought about by
discrete, supermajoritarian political acts like Article V amendments. It
may also be true that such fundamental change is always the product
of an evolutionary process and cannot be brought about by any dis-
crete political act - by a single statute, judicial decision, or executive
action, or (at the state level) by a constitutional amendment, whether
adopted by majoritarian referendum or by some other means. What is
true of Article V amendments may be equally true of these other acts:
either they will ratify (while possibly contributing to) changes that
have already taken place, or they will be ineffective until society
catches up with the aspirations of the statute or decision.
Alternatively, it may be that majoritarian acts (or judicial deci-
sions), precisely because they do not require that the ground be pre-
pared so thoroughly, can force the pace of change in a way that su-
permajoritarian acts cannot. A coalition sufficient to enact legislation
might be assembled - or a judicial decision rendered - at a point
when a society for the most part has not changed, but the legislation,
once enacted (or the decision, once made), might be an important fac-
tor in bringing about more comprehensive change. The difference be-
tween majoritarian legislation and a supermajoritarian constitutional
amendment is that the latter is far more likely to occur only after the
change has, for all practical purposes, already taken place.
Whatever one thinks of these broader speculations, however, they
certainly do not entail a general skepticism about whether political ac-
tivity matters at all. On the contrary, legislation and judicial decisions
- as well as activity in the private realm that may not even be explic-
itly political - can accumulate to bring about fundamental and lasting
changes that are then, sometimes, ratified in a textual amendment.
Sustained political and nonpolitical activity of that kind is precisely
what does bring about changes of constitutional magnitude. My claim
is that such changes seldom come about, in a mature democracy, as the
result of a formal amendment adopted by a supermajority.
In the rest of this Commentary, I try to establish the propositions
set out above: that in our system, constitutional changes occur without
amendments, and that the amendments that have been added are,
speaking generally, either unnecessary or ineffective. In Part II, I de-
scribe amendments that occurred in fact, even though the text of the
Constitution did not change, including occasions when an amendment
was proposed and rejected but the constitutional order changed any-
way. Then I turn to the amendments that have been adopted. In Part
III, I discuss the Civil War Amendments, ordinarily thought to be
among the most significant amendments to the Constitution. In Part
IV, I discuss amendments that are significant not because they worked
important changes but only because they operate as "rules of the road."
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In Part V, I turn to the Progressive Era amendments - those estab-
lishing the income tax, the direct election of Senators, and women's
suffrage - and I try to show that these amendments, too, despite their
apparent importance, were not the engines of significant change.
Along the way I compare the Civil War and Progressive Era amend-
ments to other existing or proposed amendments.
II. NON-AMENDMENT AMENDMENTS
The first indication that the role of formal amendments may be less
than meets the eye is how often important changes - what have to be
called, realistically, changes of constitutional magnitude - occur with-
out any formal amendment. Even more dramatic are the occasions on
which formal amendments were proposed and rejected, but the consti-
tutional order then changed in the way that the failed amendment en-
visaged.
A. Change Without Amendment
Our constitutional history has seen many developments that must
be regarded as changes in the constitutional order, or changes of con-
stitutional magnitude, but that were unaccompanied by a formal
amendment. This assumes, of course, that there is a difference be-
tween constitutional change, or change of constitutional magnitude,
and other kinds of change, and it is difficult to define these notions
precisely.26 Still, it is useful to distinguish between changes of an ordi-
nary kind and changes of more fundamental importance. This distinc-
tion is, at least in the first instance, only descriptive; it does not neces-
sarily suggest which kinds of changes result from legitimate
interpretation of the Constitution and which result from illegitimate,
extralegal amendments that exceed the bounds of permissible interpre-
tation. That question is one of the central issues of constitutional the-
ory, and many people have addressed it. But whatever one's views on
that issue, it should not be very controversial to say that certain fun-
damental changes have come about without a formal amendment.
One way to draw the necessarily imprecise distinction between
constitutional or fundamental changes, on the one hand, and ordinary
changes, on the other, is to identify the kinds of developments that an
untutored reader of the Constitution would expect to be accompanied
by a change in the text. These changes affect matters at the core of
what the written Constitution addresses: for example, the allocation of
power between the federal government and the states, or among the
three branches of the federal government; the scope of individual
26 For a leading discussion of this issue, see Levinson, supra note 6, at 13.
1469
HeinOnline  -- 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1469 2000-2001
HARVARD LAWREVIEW
rights against government action; and the basic rules of representative
democracy, such as who can vote and who elects which officials. In all
of these areas, changes have occurred that have to be considered sig-
nificant enough to be changes of constitutional magnitude.
One such change is the enormous growth in the permissible range
of federal legislation. Congress may now regulate areas that a century
ago were regarded as the exclusive province of the states - manufac-
turing and the employment relationship, land use and the environ-
ment, agriculture and the sale of consumer products, large areas of
criminal law. 27 This expansion of Congress's power came about prin-
cipally through judicial interpretation, especially of the Commerce
Clause. Indirectly, of course, it came about because of insistent politi-
cal and social forces that demanded legislation and ultimately would
not tolerate judicial obstruction.
This change in the scope of federal power has to be regarded as a
constitutional change.28 The text of the Constitution defines Con-
gress's powers in detail, and the scope of federal power was a principal
issue at the Constitutional Convention. But no formal amendment to
the Constitution authorized this great expansion of Congress's power.
In fact, President Franklin Roosevelt, who was responsible for one
great wave of this legislation, consciously rejected the use of Article V;
he believed he could accomplish his objectives by other means.2 9 And,
as I discuss below, the Child Labor Amendment, which would have
authorized a particular expansion of federal regulatory power in this
direction, was proposed and rejected. 30
This claim is descriptive, not normative; the point is not to suggest
that the cases expanding Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause and other provisions were usurpative or otherwise inappropri-
ate. In fact, the Commerce Clause cases of the New Deal era, which
27 The view that certain subjects were the exclusive province of the states, and off-limits to the
federal government, was articulated and applied in some (now infamous, in many quarters at least)
Supreme Court opinions - notably Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272-76 (1918); and
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). See also Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138,
144-45 (19o9); United States v. De Witt, 76 U.S. 41, 44-45 (1869). Principally, however, this limit
on congressional power was more a general understanding about the proper scope of Congress's
role than a clearly articulated or consistently enforced doctrine of constitutional law. For a promi-
nent expression of the position, see Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L.
REV. i (195o). For an account of the evolution of Supreme Court doctrine in this area, see Larry D.
Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, ioo COLUM. L.
REV. 215, 228-33 (2000).
28 See Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutionalism in the United States: From Theory to Politics, in
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 6, at 37, 38 ("I contend that change has occurred pri-
marily through non-Article V means .... ).
29 See, e.g., William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-Packing"
Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 347, 383-86.
30 See infra pp. 1475-76. •
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are usually thought to have authorized the ultimate expansion of con-
gressional power,3 1 had strong precedential roots, and they responded
to the perception that the courts could draw no principled line that
would substantially limit Congress's power a2  But however sound
those decisions were, and however strong the current Supreme Court's
inclination to nibble at the edges of the Commerce Clause power, it is
settled, in practice, that Congress may legislate about a far broader
range of subjects today than a century ago.33
The expansion of the power of the President, especially in foreign
affairs, is another constitutional change that occurred without a formal
amendment.34 Today the President is conceded broad power to use
military force overseas without a declaration of war. The President
can also enter into executive agreements, which in many respects have
the force of treaties, without the Senate consent required for a treaty,
and sometimes without any congressional participation at all. And the
courts have consistently suggested that congressional delegations of
power to the President may have a broader scope and are to receive a
more liberal construction in the field of foreign relations than in do-
mestic affairs.35  None of these powers has a clear basis in the text of
31 See, e.g., Corwin, supra note 27, at 16-17; Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Fed-
eralism: The R6le of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 543,5590- 6 & n.56 (1954).
32 See, e.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 133-53 (1998).
33 It is sometimes suggested that the failure to adopt a constitutional amendment entrenching
the New Deal made the New Deal expansion of the federal government more vulnerable to subse-
quent erosion, such as in the recent decisions reviving limits on Congress's power. See, e.g.,
KYVIG, supra note 9, at 480-84. Of course this is one of those counterfactual questions about his-
tory that is impossible to answer with much confidence. But in order to make the case for this
proposition, one cannot simply suppose that an amendment might have been adopted that "ratified
the New Deal" in general terms. One would have to identify specific language that might have
been adopted, and then show that courts inclined to reduce federal power would have felt suffi-
ciently restrained by that language. One of the reasons that President Roosevelt and his advisers
did not seek the adoption of a constitutional amendment was precisely that they doubted one could
be drafted - and adopted - that would be broad enough to permit them to accomplish their ob-
jectives and that would not embolden the Supreme Court to restrict federal power still further. See
Leuchtenburg, supra note 29, at 324-86.
34 These developments are described in Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitu-
tional?, io8 HARV. L. REV. 799 (x995); G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitu-
tional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1 (i999); and Michael J. Klarman, Constitu-
tional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Mo-
ments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759, 791 & n.197 (1992) (reviewing i ACKERMAN, supra note i9).
35 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (936), established this principle
and famously referred, in a passage on which the Executive Branch has relied many times since, to
"the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations." Id. at 32o; see also Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654, 678 (198i); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 (i98i) ("[Iln the areas of foreign policy
and national security, ... congressional silence is not to be equated with congressional disap-
proval.").
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the Constitution or the original understandings, but all have become
well established, without the aid of any textual amendments.
3 6
Similarly, the text of the Constitution does not anticipate the
growth of an enormous federal bureaucracy with the power to make
rules and adjudicate cases. The Constitution does refer to "executive
Departments," but the great expansion of the federal bureaucracy, par-
ticularly in the twentieth century, has to be considered a change of
constitutional magnitude.3 7  In addition, the regulatory agency, a cen-
tral feature of the modern federal government, came into being at the
federal level about a hundred years ago: beginning in 1887 with the In-
terstate Commerce Commission,38 Congress established a number of
agencies that combined, in some form, executive, legislative, and judi-
cial functions. The New Deal is famous for having greatly increased
the number of these agencies, but the administrative state was already
well established by 1933: the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal
Power Commission, the Federal Radio Commission, the Commodities
Exchange Authority, and other agencies already existed.3 9  These
agencies raised serious constitutional issues. They combined the func-
tions of the different branches, in apparent contravention of the sepa-
ration of powers; they engaged in adjudication, although their mem-
bers were not judges appointed pursuant to Article III; and they
assessed forms of civil liability without providing for a jury trial, ar-
guably in violation of the Seventh Amendment.40
No constitutional amendment authorized either the expansion of
the federal bureaucracy or the creation of the administrative state.
36 See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 723, 736 (1988) ("[T]he President today plays a dominant role in the national government
completely beyond the understanding in 1789."). For a nuanced argument that the original under-
standings are more complex and closer to current practice, but one that does not deny that consti-
tutional practices have evolved substantially, see H. Jefferson Powell, The Founders and the Presi-
dent's Authority over Foreign Affairs, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1471 (i999).
37 In 1816, the federal government had fewer than 5000 civilian employees. By the end of the
nineteenth century, the number was around 240,000. By 1930 - before the New Deal - there
were already over 6oo,ooo federal civilian employees. The number grew to over i,ooo,ooo by 1940
and around 2,o0,o by 1950. 2 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORI-
CAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 197o, at 1102-03 (975); see
Kramer, supra note 27, at 232.
On a per capita basis the expansion of the federal bureaucracy is of course less striking, but
still the kind of change that one would expect to be accompanied by a constitutional amendment:
the fact that the population has grown, necessitating a larger government, is just the kind of
change that, one would have thought, is properly addressed through the amendment process.
38 Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, § Ii, 24 Stat. 379, 383 (1887).
39 For a discussion of the growth of the administrative state before the New Deal, see STEPHEN
SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINIS-
TRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1866-i92o, at 121-62, 248-84 (1982).
40 On the constitutional issues raised by administrative agencies, see, for example, Gary Law-
son, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1233-49 (i994).
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But the expanded federal government is now a permanent part of our
system, beyond any serious constitutional challenge.4 1 The constitu-
tionality of administrative agencies has been settled at least since the
Supreme Court's 1932 decision in Crowell v. Benson.42 In fact, be-
cause so many agencies were already well established by then, it seems
fair to say that Crowell essentially ratified a fait accompli. This was a
change of constitutional magnitude - one that is hard to reconcile
with several provisions of the text - that took place without any for-
mal amendment.
This pattern of extratextual amendments is not just a twentieth-
century development. M'Culloch v. Maryland43 upheld the constitu-
tionality of the second Bank of the United States through a broad in-
terpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution,
an interpretation that essentially permitted Congress to enact any law
so long as it was not irrational to conclude that there was a connection
between the law and an objective Congress was allowed to pursue.44
Many people have characterized M'Culloch as an example of a Su-
preme Court decision that amended the Constitution without authori-
zation.45 According to James Madison, the most prominent member of
the Constitutional Convention, the Constitution would not have been
ratified if it had included an explicit authorization of congressional
power as sweeping as that announced by Chief Justice Marshall in
M'Culloch.46  But this aspect of M'Culloch has endured as a founda-
tional constitutional principle; indeed, it has been extended beyond the
Necessary and Proper Clause to other grants of power to Congress.47
41 See Griffin, supra note 28, at 54 ("Taken together, the various changes in the structure of the
national government made through non-Article V means during the New Deal, World War II, and
the Cold War amounted to a major program of constitutional reform.").
42 285 U.S. 22 (1932); see id. at 47-5 (upholding administrative adjudication of worker's com-
pensation claims).
43 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (i819).
44 Id. at415.
45 See, e.g., PETER SUBER, THE PARADOX OF SELF-AMENDMENT 197-2o6 (x99o), cited in
Levinson, supra note 6, at 22 & n.3L; JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING
263 (1984), cited in Levinson, supra note 6, at 22 & n.31.
46 Madison wrote in 18ig: "[Tihose who recollect, and, still more, those who shared in what
passed in the State conventions, through which the people ratified the Constitution, with respect to
the extent of the powers vested in Congress, cannot easily be persuaded that the avowal of such a
rule would not have prevented its ratification." Letter from James Madison to Judge Roane (Sept.
2, 18i9), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 435, 435 (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1966).
47 See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443-44 (1968) (interpreting the Thir-
teenth Amendment); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326-27 (1966) (interpreting the
Fifteenth Amendment); Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 558-59 (1924) (interpreting the
Eighteenth Amendment). But see City of Boerne v. Flores, 52 1 U.S. 507, 5 19-29 (997) (interpret-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement power more restrictively).
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In fact, the evolution of Madison's views about the Bank of the
United States shows that Madison - a principal author of the text of
the Constitution - was also a principal author of the idea that the
Constitution can be amended without changing the text. When Alex-
ander Hamilton first proposed the Bank of the United States, Madison
vehemently objected, saying that the Constitution did not authorize
such an expansion of federal power.48 Madison said at that time that
any alteration of the Constitution would be a usurpation if not accom-
plished through Article V.49
After an extensive debate on its constitutionality, Congress enacted
legislation establishing the Bank. 50 The term of the first Bank expired
in i8ii, and in 1815 Congress passed a bill rechartering it. Madison
was President in 1815, and he vetoed the bill - but on explicitly non-
constitutional grounds. Twenty-four years had elapsed since Hamilton
first proposed the Bank, and Madison explained that he considered the
issue of constitutionality to be "precluded ... by repeated recognitions
under varied circumstances of the validity of such an institution in
acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Govern-
ment, accompanied by indications, in different modes, of a concurrence
of the general will of the nation."51 A year later, he signed the bill cre-
ating the second Bank of the United States.
After Madison left office, the constitutionality of the Bank again
became an issue; Andrew Jackson ultimately vetoed its rechartering on
constitutional grounds. In 1831, Madison stated even more emphati-
cally his view that a well-established practice could alter the constitu-
tional regime. Declaring the Bank unconstitutional at that point
would be, he said, "a defiance of all the obligations derived from a
course of precedents amounting to the requisite evidence of the na-
tional judgment and intention."52 He asked:
[W]hich, on the whole, is most to be relied on for the true and safe con-
struction of a constitution; that which has the uniform sanction of succes-
sive legislative bodies, through a period of years and under the varied as-
cendancy of parties; or that which depends upon the opinions of every
48 2 GALES & SEATON'S DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES 1944-52 (1834), reprinted in PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTI-
TUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 11-13 (3d ed. 1992).
49 Id.; see also Washington's Farewell Address, supra note 2.
50 See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD,
1789-i8OI, at 78-80 (997).
s Veto Message from James Madison to the United States Senate (Jan. 30, I815), in 8 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 327, 327 (Gaillard Hunt ed., i90o8); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CON-
STITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS ch. 9, pt. I.B (forthcoming 2001).
52 DREW R. MCCOY, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS: JAMES MADISON AND THE REPUBLICAN
LEGACY 8I (1989) (quoting Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), in 4
LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, i86 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott &
Co. 1865)).
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new Legislature, heated as it may be by the spirit of party, eager in the
pursuit of some favourite object, or led astray by the eloquence and ad-
dress of popular statesmen, themselves, perhaps, under the influence of the
same misleading causes[?]5 3
Madison is credited with extraordinary foresight for his contribu-
tions to the Founding. But the later Madison - who envisioned that
"the uniform sanction of successive legislative bodies"5 4 could change
the Constitution, even without a formal amendment - was equally vi-
sionary about the system he had helped create.
B. Rejected Amendments That Became the Law
Even more revealing than extratextual amendments are the pro-
posed formal amendments that were rejected but that nevertheless be-
came, for all practical purposes, part of the Constitution. That is, even
though the proposed amendment failed, constitutional law changed
almost exactly as it would have if the amendment had been adopted.
The Child Labor Amendment, which would have authorized Con-
gress to enact laws regulating or forbidding labor by people under
eighteen, was approved by Congress and sent to the states in I924.s s
Congress proposed the amendment after the Supreme Court thwarted
its repeated efforts to regulate child labor by statute. In 1916, Con-
gress passed the Child Labor Act,5 6 which restricted the shipment in
interstate commerce of goods made by child labor.5 7 Two years later,
in Hammer v. Dagenhart,5s the Supreme Court invalidated the Act on
the ground that it exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause. 9 The Court reasoned, as it had in some earlier cases con-
cerning the Commerce Clause, that Congress lacked the power to
regulate "purely local" matters, such as manufacturing. The Court
also suggested that legislation purportedly enacted under the Com-
merce Clause would be invalid when Congress's intention was not to
regulate commerce but rather to reach matters (such as the age of em-
ployees) that would ordinarily not be within Congress's power.60
53 Id. at 81-82.
54 Id. at 82.
55 Section i of the proposed amendment provided: "The Congress shall have power to limit,
regulate, and prohibit the labor of persons under i8 years of age." Section 2 provided that "[tihe
power of the several States is unimpaired by this article" except to the extent needed to give effect
to congressional legislation. JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS,
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING ISSUES, 1789-1995, at 48 (1996).
56 Act of Sept. 1, 1916, ch. 432, 39 Stat. 675.
57 Id. § , 39 Stat. at 675.
58 247 U.S. 251 (i9i8).
59 Id. at 277.
60 Id. at 271-76.
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Congress tried again in I919 to regulate child labor, enacting the
Child Labor Tax Act;6 1 three years later, the Supreme Court struck
down that law, too.62  In 1924, Congress proposed the Child Labor
Amendment. 63 The proposed amendment got little support. Within a
year, nineteen states had explicitly rejected it and only four had rati-
fied it;64 by 1932, the amendment was as good as dead, having been
ratified by only six states and explicitly rejected by thirty-eight. 65
By 1941, it might as well have been added to the Constitution. In
United States v. Darby,66 the Supreme Court upheld the Fair Labor
Standards Act, which specified minimum wages and maximum hours
for individuals engaged in producing goods for interstate commerce.67
The Court in Darby explicitly overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart and re-
jected the reasoning of other decisions that limited Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause.68 It was as if the Child Labor Amend-
ment not only had been adopted but also had been given an especially
expansive reading - not just as authorizing laws forbidding child la-
bor, but as repudiating the entire approach to the Commerce Clause
that underlay Hammer and the cases on which that decision relied.
The leading recent example of this kind of amendment - rejected,
yet ultimately triumphant - is the Equal Rights Amendment, which
would have forbidden unequal treatment on the basis of sex. A ver-
sion of the ERA was first proposed in 1923.69 It was sent to the states
in 1972, but not enough states ratified it; it died in 1982.70 Today, it is
difficult to identify any respect in which constitutional law is different
61 Act of Feb. 24, I919, ch. I8, 40 Stat. 1057; see id. § 1200,40 Stat. at 1138.
62 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 39, 44 (1922).
63 See KYVIG, supra note 9, at 257. For accounts of the history of the Child Labor Amendment,
see CLARKE A. CHAMBERS, SEEDTIME OF REFORM: AMERICAN SOCIAL SERVICE AND SOCIAL
ACTION, 1918-1933, at 29-46 (1963); and WALTER I. TRATTNER, CRUSADE FOR THE CHILDREN:
A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CHILD LABOR COMMITTEE AND CHILD LABOR REFORM IN
AMERICA 163-86, 199-209 (1970). See also STEPHEN B. WOOD, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN
THE PROGRESSIVE ERA: CHILD LABOR AND THE LAW (1968).
64 ALAN P. GRIMES, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 103 (1978).
65 To be more specific, at least one house of the legislature in thirty-eight states had voted to
reject the amendment. KYVIG, supra note 9, at 307. Support for the amendment revived some-
what in the I93OS, producing a number of controversies about the validity of state ratifications.
Eventually twenty-eight states purported to ratify the amendment. See VILE, supra note 55, at 48.
On the revival of interest in the amendment, see KYVIG, supra note 9, at 307-13. The Supreme
Court's decision in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (939), addressed issues about the validity of
some of these ratifications. See id. at 447-5 6.
66 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
67 Id. at io9-o.
68 Id. at 1x6-17.
69 JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA 8 (1986).
70 See The Impact of the Equal Rights Amendment: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Con-
stitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 9 8th Cong. 92-93 (1983); KYVIG, supra note 9, at
408-19. For a general history of the ERA, see MANSBRIDGE, supra note 69.
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from what it would have been if the ERA had been adopted. 71  For
the last quarter-century, the Supreme Court has acted as if the Consti-
tution contains a provision forbidding discrimination on the basis of
gender.72  The Court requires an "exceedingly persuasive "73 justifica-
tion for gender classifications, and it invalidates gender classifications
that rest on what it considers "'archaic and overbroad' generaliza-
tion[s]," such as the view that women are less likely than men to work
outside the home. 74 The Court does treat gender-based classifications
differently from race-based classifications - the latter being the para-
digmatic form of discrimination forbidden by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment - but it has justified the difference not on the ground that the
ERA was rejected, but rather on the ground that the two forms of
classification sometimes operate differently.
75
An exchange between Justices Brennan and Powell in Frontiero v.
Richardson,76 decided while the ERA was before the states, presaged
the ultimate irrelevance of the amendment. Justice Brennan, in urging
the Court to apply strict scrutiny to gender classifications, relied in
part on Congress's "increasing sensitivity to sex-based classifications,"
revealed in antidiscrimination legislation and in the proposed ERA.
77
Justice Powell responded that the Court should wait until the fate of
the ERA was determined before taking such a step;78 he argued that
the plurality was seeking to "pre-empt" a decision reflecting "the will
of the people."79 Both arguments are plausible: the fact that the ERA
had substantial support meant, as Justice Brennan suggested, that the
Court could not be accused of acting in a highly anti-majoritarian
71 The view that "[t]here is no practical difference between what has evolved and the ERA" has
been attributed to Justice Ginsburg. Debra Baker, The Fight Ain't Over, 85 A.B.A. J. 52, 55 (1999);
see Martha Craig Daughtrey, Women and the Constitution: Where We Are at the End of the Cen-
tury, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. I, 22 (2000).
72 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-204 (976). This development began, in the Su-
preme Court, with Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 7, (971).
73 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting Mississippi University for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 51 U.S. 127, 146 (1994).
74 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975) (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.
498, 508 (1975)); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (stating that differential treat-
ment cannot be based "on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or pref-
erences of males and females").
75 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532 & n.6 (discussing differences between
race- and gender-based classifications). Compare id. at 533-34 & n.7 (suggesting that single-sex
schools might be constitutional because of "'[i]nherent differences' between men and women" and
because sex-based classifications might "advance full development of the talent and capacities of
our Nation's people"), with Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (954) (declaring racially seg-
regated education "inherently unequal").
76 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
77 Id. at 687 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.).
78 Id. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
79 Id.
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way; the fact that the ERA had not been adopted meant, as Justice
Powell suggested, that the Court was, in a sense, preempting the
amendment process. In other words, the existence of substantial
popular support for the proposed ERA provided reasonable arguments
for diametrically opposed positions - suggesting that the ultimate fate
of the ERA simply would not matter that much.
Again, it would be a mistake to say that an overly activist Court
"ratified" the ERA in the face of a contrary verdict from the country.
What "ratified" the ERA, in effect, was the same kind of thing that
"ratified" the Child Labor Amendment: insistent pressure from society
as a whole. In the case of the ERA, this took the form of the increas-
ing presence of women in the workplace, in politics, and in other new
roles.80 Instead of saying that the courts imposed an agenda on soci-
ety, it is probably more accurate to say that the opposite occurred: be-
cause of developments in society, the Court would have found it very
difficult to continue treating gender classifications as unproblematic.
The recent decision in United States v. Virginia,8 ' which invali-
dated the all-male admission policy at the Virginia Military Institute,82
is an example. Twenty years before that case was decided, women
were admitted to the service academies, 8 3 not because of a court order,
but because of a decision that Congress made after extensive consid-
eration. 4 In United States v. Virginia, the Supreme Court explicitly
referred to the experience of the service academies, which made VMI
seem more like an anachronism. 5 A variety of forces, then - changes
in society, legislation and executive action, judicial decisions - com-
bined to bring about what the ERA would have established.
III. THE CIVIL WAR AMENDMENTS (AND NON-AMENDMENTS)
Even if the Constitution can change without a constitutional
amendment and rejected constitutional amendments can end up, in ef-
fect, becoming the law, it does not follow that the amendments that do
get adopted are unimportant. Offhand one might say that it is impos-
sible to deny the significance of the Civil War Amendments: the Thir-
80 Cf Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) ("The ability of women to partici-
pate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to
control their reproductive lives.").8 1 518 U.S. 5 15 (i996).
82 Id. at 555-58.
83 See Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 94-io6, § 803, 89
Stat. 531, 537-38 (975) (codified as amended at io U.S.C. §§ 4342, 6954, 6956(d), 9342 (199));
JEANNE HOLM, WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: AN UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 310 (rev. ed. 1992).
84 See Hearings on H.R. 9832 Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the House Comm. on Armed Servs.,
93d Cong. (i974); HOLM, supra note 83, at 305-10.
85 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 544-45.
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teenth Amendment, which abolished slavery;8 6  the Fourteenth
Amendment, which provides for national citizenship and contains the
Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges or Immunities Clauses;
7
and the Fifteenth Amendment, which forbids discrimination in voting
"on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." 8
In fact these amendments changed things much less than one might
think. The Civil War itself, needless to say, worked enormous
changes. And ultimately the nation changed in many of the ways that
the Civil War Amendments envisioned; today racial minorities are not
excluded from voting, for example. But it was not the amendments
that changed things. The amendments made relatively little difference
when they were adopted; the changes they prescribed came about only
when society itself changed. Again the true mechanism of constitu-
tional change was not the distinct acts of a sovereign people expressing
its will through formal amendments to the Constitution, but a different
kind of process (or, in the case of the Civil War, a traumatic event) in
which changes to the text of the Constitution were sidelights.
To begin with, it is not at all clear that the Civil War Amendments
should be regarded as formal amendments of the kind Article V
authorizes. The process by which they were ratified was highly ir-
regular.89 The Thirteenth Amendment received crucial ratification
votes from state legislatures in ex-Confederate states that were con-
trolled by governments installed by the North. The Confederate states
were required to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment to be readmitted to
the Union; those states still outside the Union were required to ratify
the Fifteenth Amendment. Even the number of states in the Union -
for purposes of determining whether three-fourths of the states had
ratified the Amendments - was unclear.90 In these circumstances, the
Civil War Amendments are probably better seen not as formal
amendments but as something in the nature of a treaty, reflecting the
outcome of the war, including the subsequent political struggle to de-
termine what the outcome of the war would be. The states of the
Confederacy did not so much ratify the amendments as submit to
86 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
87 Id. amend. XIV, § i.
88 Id. amend. XV, § i.
89 For a comprehensive treatment (which concludes that the amendments were validly ratified),
see John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. (forth-
coming Spring 2OO).
90 On the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, see the discussion in 2 ACKERMAN, supra
note ig, at 99-i19. On the Fourteenth Amendment, see, for example, ERIC L. MCKITRICK,
ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 326-63 (1960). On the Fifteenth Amendment, see, for
example, WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE
FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 84-85 (1969). See also RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN WITH JEROME AGEL,
AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LOVE THE CONSTITUTION SO MUCH, WHY DO WE KEEP TRYING
To CHANGE IT? 102-03, 109, 115 (1993).
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them because they were the defeated parties and had little choice. The
victors also bound themselves, in order to make the terms of peace
more palatable and 'to avoid charges of rank hypocrisy."9'
However one characterizes the Civil War Amendments, the most
conspicuous thing about them is how little they meant in the first cen-
tury after they were ratified. This is not to say that they meant noth-
ing. The Civil War Amendments did serve a limited role, comparable
to the role that other amendments serve. But they were not the prin-
cipal means of constitutional change.
A. The Thirteenth Amendment (With an Aside on the Poll Tax)
The practical effect of the Thirteenth Amendment was, at most, to
abolish slavery only in the four border states (Delaware, Maryland,
Kentucky, and Missouri) that had not joined the Confederacy. The
Emancipation Proclamation (which applied to "the States and parts of
States [then] in rebellion against the United States")92 - and, more to
the point, the Union army - had already emancipated the slaves
elsewhere. As a Union army officer said in 1863: "Slavery is dead; that
is the first thing. That is what we all begin with here, who know the
state of affairs."93 In this sense, the Thirteenth Amendment is an ex-
ample of an amendment that suppressed outliers before they would
have been suppressed by other means. As a practical matter, slavery
probably could not have persisted in the border states for long after
the end of the Civil War; in any event, Congress very likely would
have outlawed it, and the Supreme Court might have upheld Con-
gress's action. 94 Probably the most that can be said for the Thirteenth
Amendment is that it hastened the end of slavery in a few border
91 Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 349.
92 Abraham Lincoln, A Proclamation (Jan. i, 1863), reprinted in 12 Stat. app. at 1268, 1268.
93 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 7 (1988).
94 Before the Civil War, various arguments that the Constitution either forbade slavery or was
hostile to it were seriously advanced. See, e.g., ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE
MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 73-102 (1970)
[hereinafter FONER, FREE SOIL]; WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTI-
TUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 265-75 (i977). Frederick Douglass was one of the most
famous of those who took this position, and his doing so contributed to his acrimonious split from
William Lloyd Garrison and others who believed that the Constitution was irredeemably pro-
slavery. FONER, FREE SOIL, supra, at 48-53, 64-65. For Douglass's position, see Frederick
Douglass, The Constitution of the United States: Is It Pro-Slavery or Anti-Slavery? (Mar. 26, i86o),
in 2 PHILIP S. FONER, THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, PRE-CIVIL WAR
DECADE 185o-i86o, at 467 (1950). See id. at 477-78 (relying on the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, the clause restricting suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the Bill of
Attainder Clause). On the division among abolitionists on this issue, see, for example, FONER,
FREE SOIL, supra, at 52-54. The Guaranty Clause and, perhaps, the Commerce Clause or the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment could have been plausible bases for congressional action
outlawing slavery if the Thirteenth Amendment had not been adopted. See generally Levinson,
supra note 6, at 30-31 (outlining the Commerce Clause argument).
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states by a few years. That is not trivial, but it is a far cry from being
a principal means of constitutional change.
Among the more recent amendments, the Twenty-fourth Amend-
ment, which outlaws the use of a poll tax in federal elections, most
closely resembles the Thirteenth Amendment. When the Twenty-
fourth Amendment was proposed, only five states had poll taxes at
all.95 The Twenty-fourth Amendment forbade those states from using
the poll tax in federal elections - a clear example of an amendment
that has the effect only of suppressing outliers.
Later events reveal even more about the Twenty-fourth Amend-
ment. A few states continued to use the poll tax in state elections,
which the amendment did not reach. But two years after the Twenty-
fourth Amendment was adopted, the Supreme Court, in Harper v. Vir-
ginia Board of Elections,96 invalidated the use of poll taxes in state
elections, too.97 The Court in Harper did not invoke the Twenty-
fourth Amendment as a basis for its decision; nor did it explain why it
was effectively expanding the Twenty-fourth Amendment beyond the
text that was ratified. Rather, the Court followed a series of decisions,
beginning with Reynolds v. Sims,98 that established the principle of
"one person, one vote" and invalidated a variety of state restrictions on
the franchise. 99
In view of Harper, the net effect of the Twenty-fourth Amendment
was, at most, to abolish the poll tax in federal elections, in a few states,
two years before it would have been abolished across the board any-
way. Even that limited purpose probably could have been accom-
plished by federal legislation without amending the Constitution.10 0
For that matter, federal legislation almost certainly could have abol-
ished the poll tax in state elections as well. 10 1 The Voting Rights Act
of 1965 outlawed literacy tests even in state elections in jurisdictions
where there was reason to fear that literacy tests and other devices
were being used to discriminate; 10 2 the poll tax, like the literacy test,
had a close historical association with the de facto disenfranchisement
95 Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 539 (I965); KYVIG, supra note 9, at 356. Virginia
changed its law in anticipation of the ratification of the amendment, although the Court declared
the revised law unconstitutional. Harman, 38o U.S. at 540-42.
96 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
97 Id. at 666.
98 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
99 Harper, 383 U.S. at 667-70.
100 This conclusion appears to follow from Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. I12 (970), in which the
Court held that Congress could authorize eighteen-year-olds to vote in federal elections. See id. at
119-24 (opinion of Black, J.); id. at 135-44 (opinion of Douglas, J.); id. at 239-81 (opinion of Bren-
nan, White, and Marshall, JJ.).
101 Justice Black, who dissented vigorously in Harper, wrote that he had "no doubt at all" that
Congress had this power. Harper, 383 U.S. at 679 (Black, J., dissenting).
102 Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1994).
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of African-Americans. 10 3 So the Twenty-fourth Amendment, too, bears
out the thesis that things would look much the same even if a formal
amendment process were not part of the Constitution.
In fact, the Twenty-fourth Amendment may be another example -
like the Equal Rights Amendment and the Child Labor Amendment
- of a rejected amendment that nonetheless became the law. The fact
that the Twenty-fourth Amendment was limited to federal elections
suggests that the opponents of the poll tax did not think an amend-
ment banning poll taxes in all elections would be ratified. Instead,
Congress included a provision in the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that
directed the Attorney General to challenge the constitutionality of poll
taxes in state elections. 10 4  The omitted part of the Twenty-fourth
Amendment was what the Supreme Court "adopted" in Harper. When
one takes into account Supreme Court decisions, possible congressional
legislation, and the states' own actions, the Twenty-fourth Amendment
begins to look like window dressing.
It is true that ordinary legislation would not have formally en-
trenched the abolition of the poll tax in the way that an amendment
did. But no state has tried to reenact poll taxes for state elections and
get Harper overruled, and no state has tried to reinstitute literacy tests
and have that provision of the Voting Rights Act repealed. In any
event, the power of an amendment to entrench change should not be
overstated. Even an amendment cannot guarantee that a change will
be permanent, as the history of the other Civil War Amendments
shows.
B. The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and the Civil War's
Greatest Non-Amendment
The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments present a somewhat
different story. Unlike the Thirteenth Amendment, the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments did not target an institution that had al-
ready lost much of its importance by the time the Civil War ended.
The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments addressed matters of great
importance to the post-Civil War South. But they were ahead of their
103 See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at z18 (upholding a federal statute "prohibiting the use of literacy tests
or other devices used to discriminate against voters on account of their race in both state and fed-
eral elections'; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966) (upholding provisions of
the Voting Rights Act that outlawed literacy tests in certain jurisdictions). On the use of the poll
tax to discriminate against African-Americans, see, for example, J. MORGAN KouSSER, THE
SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
ONE-PARTY SOUTH, i880-i9IO, at 63-72 (i974).
104 Voting Rights Act of 1965 § io(b), 42 U.S.C. § 197 3 h(b) (x994). The Attorney General's
challenge led to the decision in Harper. See MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1961-1991, at 23-24 (1997).
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time, and they consequently ended up having little lasting effect until
their time came around, in the mid-twentieth century.
The Fifteenth Amendment, barring discrimination against blacks
and former slaves in voting, presents the more dramatic case. The Fif-
teenth Amendment was not nullified all at once. It had important ef-
fects in the South until the end of the nineteenth century. In addition,
the Fifteenth Amendment helped blacks gain the franchise in the
North.105 But for the most part, the Fifteenth Amendment is the in-
verse of the Equal Rights Amendment: it was added to the Constitu-
tion's text but did not become part of the Constitution in operation.
The Fifteenth Amendment was ratified in 1870.106 By the late
i88os, it was being blatantly subverted in much of the South. South-
ern states adopted a variety of devices, such as literacy tests and poll
taxes, that did not explicitly deny blacks the vote but that were delib-
erately designed to disenfranchise them. When such ostensibly legal
means did not work well enough, Southern whites used intimidation
and outright violence. By the turn of the century, African-Americans
were effectively disenfranchised throughout almost the entire region.
10 7
The Amendment continued to be nullified on a large scale until the
middle of the twentieth century.108
If one were to read the Constitution and take the amendments at
face value, one would conclude that the Fifteenth Amendment perma-
nently enfranchised African-Americans. It did not. To a limited de-
gree, the Union army and the political changes imposed on the South
in the aftermath of its occupation did; but when those effects faded,
the Fifteenth Amendment might as well not have been part of the
Constitution. Not until one hundred years later did the Voting Rights
Act - itself the product of long-term social and economic forces -
genuinely enfranchise blacks. The Constitution, in practice, did not
change with the Amendment. It changed only when deeper changes
occurred in society.
The Fourteenth Amendment is a less dramatic case because its re-
quirements are not as clear as those of the Fifteenth. It is easier to
demonstrate that blacks were denied the vote on the basis of their race
than to demonstrate that they were denied "equal protection" or
"privileges or immunities," because the latter terms are more vague.
105 On this point, see Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory,
77 VA. L. REV. 747, 793-99 (199).
106 FONER, supra note 93, at 422.
107 Klarman, supra note gi, at 351-58.
108 For state-by-state specifics, see QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-199o, at 38-298 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994);
and Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295,
301-04 (2000).
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But in many ways the Fourteenth Amendment presents the same pat-
tern as the Fifteenth. And what it accomplished is swamped by what
it did not accomplish.
The Fourteenth Amendment had one immediate legal effect: it
outlawed the Black Codes, laws adopted throughout the South that
more or less sought to reinstitute slavery by imposing various restric-
tions and disabilities on African-Americans. 10 9 But even in this re-
spect, it is not clear that the Amendment was crucial. Congress be-
lieved it had the power to abolish the Black Codes without the
Fourteenth Amendment.1 10 The Reconstruction Congress enacted the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was directed at the Black Codes, be-
fore the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted."' The Fourteenth
Amendment was designed to ensure the Civil Rights Act's constitu-
tionality, but many Republicans believed at the time that the Act was
constitutional even without the amendment and that "the amendment
was simply declaratory of existing constitutional law, properly under-
stood." 112 Had the Supreme Court accepted this view, neither Section
i of the Fourteenth Amendment, outlawing Black Codes and similar
state legislation, nor Section 5, authorizing congressional action to en-
force the Amendment, would have been needed at all.
Some of the members of Congress who thought that the Fourteenth
Amendment was unnecessary invoked the Thirteenth Amendment in-
stead. But most also relied extensively on the Guaranty Clause, "the
jewel of the Constitution," in the words of one Radical Republican. 13
Some supporters of the Civil Rights Act also revived antebellum theo-
ries of the unconstitutionality of slavery or took the position that seces-
sion and civil war created their "own logic and imperatives." 1 4 In any
event, even if the Fourteenth Amendment (or the Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Amendments in combination) were instrumental in getting rid
of the Black Codes, that limited accomplishment falls far short of
working a substantial change. Massive denials of equality to African-
Americans, of a kind that the Equal Protection and Privileges or Im-
munities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment were intended to pro-
hibit, persisted until the I95os and the civil rights revolution.
Still, it might be said, when the civil rights revolution of the 195OS
did occur, it was important that the Fourteenth Amendment supplied a
109 See FONER, supra note 93, at 199-202.
110 See id. at 244.
11 President Andrew Johnson vetoed the bill that became the i866 Act, and Congress overrode
the veto. See id. at 25o-51; MCKITRICK, supra note go, at 323-24.
112 MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS gi (1986); see Howard Jay Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth
Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REV. 3 (954).
113 FONER, supra note 93, at 232 (quoting Sen. Richard Yates).
114 Id. (referring to Rep. Thaddeus Stevens).
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textual promise of equality to which advocates, and ultimately the Su-
preme Court, could point. But even this limited effect cannot be at-
tributed to the Fourteenth Amendment without qualification. When
the Supreme Court declared state-sponsored racial segregation uncon-
stitutional in Brown v. Board of Education-' and its sequelae, the
Court also ruled, in Bolling v. Sharpe, 1 6 that the Constitution barred
the federal government from segregating the schools of the District of
Columbia.'17 Of course the Equal Protection Clause applies only to
the states, not to the federal government. The Court in Boiling relied
on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, but this was a no-
toriously questionable rationale: among other things, the Fifth
Amendment was adopted at a time when slavery was legal and protec-
tion of the slave trade was entrenched in the Constitution.1
8
The Supreme Court's willingness to decide Boiling without a se-
cure (or, many would say, even a plausible) textual basis in the Consti-
tution suggests that events in the 195OS and I96os would not have
taken a dramatically different course if the victors of the Civil War
had not added the language of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution. It is difficult to believe that the Supreme Court would have
ruled differently in Brown if the Fourteenth Amendment had not been
adopted - if, for example, there had been a consensus after the Civil
War that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was constitutional even without
the Amendment and if the Reconstruction Congress had turned its at-
tention elsewhere instead of proposing an amendment. It seems more
likely that the Court (with help, of course, from the litigators who
brought the series of cases leading up to Brown) would have identified
some other text in the Constitution as the formal basis for the claim of
equality."19 Of course this is all, again, necessarily speculative. Per-
lls 347 U.s. 483 (1954).
116 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
117 Id. at499-500.
118 A text-based argument in favor of Boiling is put forward in Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextual-
ism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 768-73 (1gg), which invokes, in addition to the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Title of Nobil-
ity Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8, and the Bill of Attainder Clause, id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. See
also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (995) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggest-
ing the Title of Nobility Clause and the Bill of Attainder Clause as possible bases for applying
equal protection principles to the federal government).
119 The possibilities include the clauses that the antebellum opponents of slavery and the Recon-
struction Congress suggested, such as the Guaranty Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment (which has always been interpreted to apply only to the federal government but is not
explicitly so limited), and some of the candidates put forward by those who defend Bolling on tex-
tual grounds, see, e.g., supra note I18.
In fact, it is possible that the Court in Brown and similar cases was already relying on the
"wrong" provision - that the the Privileges or Immunities Clause, not the Equal Protection
Clause, was intended to be the true equality-protecting provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED
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haps if there had been no post-Civil War textual amendment to be in-
voked against racial segregation, the dynamics of the public and legal
debate would have been different. But at least there are good reasons
to believe that the absence of such a provision would not have stood in
the way of outlawing segregation in 1954.
The most conspicuous Civil War non-amendment supports this
conjecture. Before the Civil War, the question whether the Constitu-
tion permits a state to secede from the Union was a subject of lively
debate. In the decades leading up to the Civil War, respected political
and legal figures advanced serious legal arguments, claiming descent
from Jefferson's Kentucky Resolutions, in support of the right to se-
cede. 120 No amendment adopted after the Civil War settled this ques-
tion, either expressly or by any reasonably direct implication.
Yet the question has, without doubt, been settled. The person on
the street would say that the Civil War settled it, and that person
would be right. The Civil War settled it, even though no formal
amendment was added to the Constitution.1 2 1 The Civil War settled
the question of the constitutionality of slavery in the same way, and it
settled (or, more accurately, began the process of settling) the question
of racial equality. The Secession Amendment, by its absence, makes it
difficult to argue that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, or Fifteenth
Amendments made as much difference as one might unreflectively
think. The role of the formal Civil War amendments - which, be-
cause of the irregularities in the ratification process, might not even be
correctly described as formal amendments - can be plausibly charac-
terized as limited and incidental.
IV. RULES OF THE ROAD
Some constitutional amendments are remarkable for their relative
lack of importance. The fluky Twenty-seventh Amendment, adopted
200 years after it was proposed, prohibits members of Congress from
voting an increase in their own salaries effective before the next elec-
tion of the House of Representatives; it seems safe to say that this
YEARS 1789-1888, at 342-51 (1985); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, 1Oi YALE L.J. 1385, 1433-34 (1992). The Court's decision in The Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. (6 Wall.) 36 (1873), took the Privileges or Immunities Clause out of the picture. The
Court's ability to invoke the Equal Protection Clause as a prohibition against race discrimination,
even though it was apparently not originally intended to have that effect, is additional evidence
that, even without a Fourteenth Amendment, the Court would have found some textual basis for
Brown.
120 See JESSE T. CARPENTER, THE SOUTH AS A CONSCIOUS MINORITY, 1779-1861, at 200-13
(93o); DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS 1848-1861, at 479-84 (Don E. Fehrenbacher
ed., 1976).
121 In Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1868), the Supreme Court declared that secession was an ille-
gal act. See id. at 724-26.
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Amendment has no significant effect. But many constitutional amend-
ments, although not important in the way that amendments are usu-
ally thought to be, still serve a nontrivial purpose. They address mat-
ters that must be settled one way or another - but how they are set-
tled is not so important. An analogy is to the rule that traffic must
keep to the right.
The Twenty-fifth Amendment, which governs Presidential succes-
sion and disability, is a prime example.1 2 2 Obviously it is very impor-
tant that there be a clear answer to the question who can exercise the
powers of the Presidency. Also there are better and worse ways to de-
termine the answer to that question, should it be in doubt. In these
ways the Twenty-fifth Amendment is certainly important. 123 But this
is obviously a very different matter from working a fundamental
change in society.
The Twentieth Amendment falls into the same category. This
Amendment moved Inauguration Day from March 4 to January 20
and established that Congress is to convene on January 3 of each year
unless Congress specifies a different date by law. (The Twentieth
Amendment also addresses presidential succession when the President
elect or a candidate dies.' 24) Of course, this amendment could, under
certain circumstances, make an enormous difference. If a foreign
power threatened nuclear war on February i of the year after an elec-
tion, the adoption of the Twentieth Amendment might make literally
all the difference in the world. But any rule of the road can be impor-
tant in that way.
The Twentieth Amendment, in fact, reveals the limited role that
formal textual amendments play. The Twentieth Amendment is com-
monly called the Lame Duck Amendment, because its proponents were
concerned about Congress acting when some of its members had re-
cently been defeated for reelection. An amendment that prohibited ac-
tion (except, say, for emergency action) by lame duck Congresses might
be said to have made a significant substantive change in the constitu-
tional order, although it would be more of a clarification than a fun-
damental change. But the Twentieth Amendment did not actually
forbid action by lame duck Congresses; a version that would have ac-
complished that result more directly was rejected. 25 It can be argued
- indeed, it has been powerfully argued - that the Amendment re-
122 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
123 For a general discussion, see JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS
COMPLETE HISTORY AND APPLICATIONS (2d ed. 1992).
124 U.S. CONST. amend. XX, §§ 1-4.
125 BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE CASE AGAINST LAMEDUCK IMPEACHMENT 20-31 (iggg); see also
id. at 30-31 ("[Tlhe text of the twentieth amendment does not explicitly abolish lameduck sessions,
or even restrict them to cases of clear and present national emergencies.").
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flects a judgment that lame duck action should be avoided. But that
argument relies on something more than the text of the Amendment.
12 6
Still, the amendment process in our system does serve to settle mat-
ters of relative detail that need a decisive resolution. But this is not
inconsistent with the claim that things would look the same even if
there were no formal amendment process. If the Constitution could
not be amended, it seems likely that the courts would interpret the
Constitution to allow Congress to settle such matters by ordinary leg-
islation. Why wouldn't they? Rules of the road are important, but the
stakes are low; there is no reason to require a supermajority, as op-
posed to a simple legislative majority, to establish them.
Indeed, the Supreme Court's interpretation of Article V suggests
that the Court would be receptive to the argument that a simple legis-
lative majority should be allowed to establish rules of the road, espe-
cially when they are urgently needed. In Coleman v. Miller,'27 the
Court ruled that certain questions about whether a state's ratification
of a constitutional amendment is valid are political questions; 28 the
Court will not overturn Congress's judgment on those issues. The rea-
son the Court chose this allocation of authority seems clear: it is impor-
tant to establish definitively how many states have ratified, and be-
cause constitutional amendments are a way of overturning a Supreme
Court decision, the Court itself is not a suitable body to make that de-
termination. If practical considerations like these led the Court to
grant Congress the power to interpret Article V, why would the Court
not similarly allow Congress to establish rules respecting, for example,
Presidential disability, if that were the only way to set clear rules? 12 9
The Twenty-sixth Amendment, which grants eighteen-year-olds the
right to vote in all elections, 130 combines features of the amendments
setting rules of the road and the amendments suppressing outliers.
Someone who did not know the background of the Amendment might
126 See, e.g., id. at i i (invoking "the lessons of history and the teachings of fundamental princi-
ple"); id. at 42-66 (relying on precedent).
127 307 U.S. 433 (I939).
128 Id. at 450.
129 In fact, the text of the Constitution can be interpreted, without too much difficulty, to allow
Congress to deal with both presidential disability and the lame duck issue. Article II, Section i,
Clause 6, combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, could
reasonably be interpreted to allow Congress to do everything that the Twenty-fifth Amendment
did. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT,
AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON I28-3o (1999) (criticizing arguments to the contrary). Even
before the Twentieth Amendment was adopted, Congress had the power to provide by statute
when its session Was to begin. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2. The Constitution does not explicitly
state when the terms of members of Congress expire, but various provisions in the Constitution
arguably allow that to be determined by statute (as it was before the Twentieth Amendment), or by
each house. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. i; id. art. I, § 5, cl. i; id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
130 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § i.
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think of it as something much more significant - perhaps a decision
by the People, during the Vietnam War and in response to the baby
boom generation, that eighteen-year-olds should have the franchise.
The People may have made such a decision, but if so, they made it be-
fore the formal amendment process began.
The Twenty-sixth Amendment was added to the Constitution be-
cause Congress and the Supreme Court together had created an unten-
able situation.13 1 In 1970, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act to
prohibit any state from denying the vote to eighteen-year-olds. 132 The
Supreme Court upheld that legislation as applied to federal elections
but invalidated it as applied to state elections. 133 The states thus con-
fronted the administrative nightmare of conducting elections with two
different electorates, 1 34 and they put up no resistance to lowering the
voting age across the board. Congress approved the Twenty-sixth
Amendment three months after the Court's decision; the states ratified
it in three months. 135 No other amendment has ever been ratified so
quickly. 136
What would have happened if there were no formal amendment
process? The lack of resistance to the Twenty-sixth Amendment sug-
gests that inevitably most of the states, and probably all of them,
would have changed their laws within a relatively short time. In fact,
while ten states had specifically rejected proposals to lower the voting
age to eighteen during the few years before the Twenty-sixth Amend-
ment, eight of those ten then ratified the Amendment. 137 The formal
amendment process was a way to effect change quickly and across the
board, without further administrative messiness. But by the time
Congress sent the Twenty-sixth Amendment to the states, it was al-
ready a foregone conclusion that eighteen-year-olds would soon be
voting in all elections.
V. THE PROGRESSIVE ERA AMENDMENTS
Everyone knows that the Constitution has not been amended often.
Perhaps even more striking, though, is that the amendments that have
been adopted are concentrated in just a few periods in our history.
131 For a general discussion of the Twenty-sixth Amendment and its history, see KYVIG, supra
note 9, at 363-68.
132 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, sec. 6, § 302, 84 Stat. 314, 318
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 197 3 bb (1994)).
133 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 130 (970).
134 See CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS SUBCOMM., SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 92D
CONG., LOWERING THE VOTING AGE TO 18: A FIFTY-STATE SURVEY OF THE COSTS AND OTHER
PROBLEMS OF DUAL-AGE VOTING (Comm. Print 1971).
135 BERNSTEIN WITH AGEL, supira note 90, at 307.
136 KYVIG, supra note 9, at 367-68.
137 Id.
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The first ten amendments were ratified in 1791; two more were added
in 1798 and 1804, respectively, as the new constitutional order settled
in.' 38 After that, however - except for the three Civil War Amend-
ments, which obviously arose from extraordinary circumstances - no
amendments were adopted for almost i io years. 139
Then, beginning in I913, the Constitution was amended four times
in seven years. 140 All four of those amendments concerned important
subjects: The Sixteenth Amendment authorized an income tax. 141 The
Seventeenth Amendment provided that Senators would be elected di-
rectly by the people of each state, not by state legislatures.1 42 The
Eighteenth Amendment inaugurated Prohibition 143 (which the Twenty-
first Amendment subsequently repealed14 4). The Nineteenth Amend-
ment provided that "[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged . . . on account of sex."
1 45
Surely, one might think, these amendments are significant. No one
can deny the importance of the income tax or of women's suffrage.
And many people trace the decline of state prerogatives, and the ex-
pansion of federal regulatory power, to the Seventeenth Amendment,
on the theory that it weakened the connection between Senators and
the governments of the states they represented. 146
Here again, though, the story is more complicated than it appears,
and the role of formal amendments is much less than meets the eye.
The fact that such a high proportion of the substantive, controversial
amendments to the Constitution were concentrated in this period is it-
self revealing. While the Progressive Era was an important time of
change in the United States, there have been other important eras of
change when no substantive amendments were adopted - the Jeffer-
son and Jackson eras, the New Deal, the end of Reconstruction, the
civil rights revolution. This suggests that the formal amendment pro-
cess is not a central mechanism of change, a suggestion borne out by
the history of the Progressive Era amendments.
138 BERNSTEIN WITH AGEL, supra note 90, at 305.
139 Id. at 305-o6.
140 Id. at 3o6.
141 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
142 Id. amend. XVII, § i.
143 Id. amend. XVIII, § i.
144 Id. amend. XXI, § i.
145 Id. amend. XIX, § i.
146 See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests: A Public Choice Analysis of the
Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L. REV. 1007, 1009 (1994) ("The ratification of the Seventeenth
Amendment ... undermined the twin structural pillars of the Constitution: federalism and the
separation of powers.'; see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 565 n.9
(1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Seventeenth Amendment and other factors have
dulled Congress's sensitivity to state concerns).
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A. The Income Tax (With an Aside on Presidential Term Limits)
The Sixteenth Amendment was a direct response to the Supreme
Court's decision in Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust.147 Pollock struck
down a federal income tax on the ground that it was a "direct" tax,
which under Article I, Section 2 must be apportioned among the
states. 148 But Pollock was a surprising decision that did not reflect the
way the law was understood at the time and did not much change the
direction in which the law subsequently evolved. 149 Before Pollock,
the Supreme Court had repeatedly rejected claims that the category of
"direct taxes" - a particularly ill-defined notion 150 - included inheri-
tance taxes, taxes on notes issued by state banks, or taxes on insurance
premiums.'51 In 1881, just fourteen years before Pollock, the Supreme
Court upheld an income tax that was imposed during the Civil War
but not repealed until 1872.152
As a result, when the movement for a federal income tax gathered
speed in the late nineteenth century, the constitutionality of the tax
was not seen as an important question. 153 Pollock was widely and
immediately condemned; one commentator, writing at the time, com-
pared the hostility to Pollock to the reaction to the Dred Scott deci-
sion.'3 4 President and Chief Justice-to-be William Howard Taft said:
"Nothing has ever injured the prestige of the Supreme Court more
"155
After Pollock was decided, there was considerable sentiment in
Congress for simply enacting an income tax statute - not so much as
an act of defiance but because many were convinced that the Court
would not adhere to Pollock.156 The Court did little to dispel this con-
viction. A few years after Pollock, the Court upheld an inheritance
147 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
148 Id. at 582-83.
149 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. I, 4-5, 25
(ig9); id. at 28 (characterizing Pollock as "one of the Court's greatest breaches with the principle
of stare decisis"). I am indebted to Nancy Staudt for discussion of the arguments in this section.
150 See Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-Up in the Core of the Con-
stitution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 46-71 (1999).
151 See Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331, 347-48 (1875) (inheritance taxes); Veazie Bank v.
Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 546-47 (1869) (notes issued by state banks); Pac. Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 433,443,446 (1869) (insurance premiums).
152 Springer v. United States, 102 U.S 586, 602 (i881).
133 See KYVIG, supra note 9, at 194 ("[In 1894 debate over a new federal income tax centered
not on its constitutionality, which was assumed, but on whether it was good public policy.").
154 Joseph R. Long, Tinkering with the Constitution, 24 YALE L.J. 573,576 (1915).
155 1 ARCHIBALD BUTT, TAFT AND ROOSEVELT 134 (1930) (quoting Taft, as reported in a pri-
vate letter), quoted in Ackerman, supra note 149, at5.
156 See KYVIG, supra note 9, at 201-02; Ackerman, supra note 149, at 33-34.
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tax, reasoning that it was an excise tax and therefore indirect. 5 7 In
accepting the Republican nomination for President in 1908, Taft en-
dorsed an income tax and suggested that a constitutional amendment
would be unnecessary, both because the Court's decisions might be in-
terpreted to allow some kind of income tax and because the Court's
membership had changed.15 8
After Taft became President he changed his view about the need
for an amendment, and in i909 - as part of a package of complex
political maneuvers by both supporters and opponents of the income
tax - Congress (with the Senate voting unanimously) proposed the
Sixteenth Amendment to the states.' 5 9 At nearly the same time, Con-
gress enacted a tax on corporations that was measured by their in-
come; while the proposed amendment was before the state legislatures,
the Court upheld the corporate income tax, again narrowing Pollock
by reasoning that the tax was not an income tax but an excise tax on
the privilege of doing business in corporate form. 160  After the Six-
teenth Amendment was adopted, the Court, in upholding the new in-
come tax, characterized the amendment as restoring power that Con-
gress had assumed to exist before Pollock was decided. 161
In this instance, too, the primary mechanism of change was not the
amendment process but the long-term development of popular opinion.
The Supreme Court essentially accepted the income tax both before
and after the Sixteenth Amendment. Pollock was a momentary aber-
ration, as the Court itself all but admitted. It is true that the amend-
ment dispatched Pollock cleanly and decisively; without an amend-
ment, Pollock would have continued to cast a cloud over the income
tax. But Pollock had all the earmarks of a precedent that was des-
tined to be overruled: it was inconsistent with earlier cases, subsequent
cases immediately construed it narrowly, and it faced strong popular
opposition. The Sixteenth Amendment put an end to the sideshow
that Pollock began, but a sideshow was all it was.
The Twenty-second Amendment, which limits a President to two
terms in office, 162 is of course not a Progressive Era amendment - it
157 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 78-83 (igoo); see also Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain,
192 U.S. 397, 412-15 (904) (holding that a tax on sugar refining was an excise tax, not a direct
tax).
158 SIDNEY RATNER, AMERICAN TAXATION, 1789-1913, at 268-69 (1942).
159 Ackerman, supra note 149, at 34-39 & n.I49.
160 Flint v. Stone 'racy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 150-52 (191 I).
161 See Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1916); Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R.
Co., 240 U.S. I, 17-18 (1916). On these events, see generally JOHN D. BUENKER, THE INCOME
TAX AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1985); RATNER, supra note 158, at 193-214, 298-320; EDWIN
R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX (2d ed. 1914); and ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW
IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 1861-1913 (1993).
162 U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § i.
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was adopted in 1951 - but in certain respects it can be compared to
the Sixteenth Amendment. Before President Franklin Roosevelt ran
for a third term, there was an unbroken tradition that Presidents
would not do so. The Twenty-second Amendment restored that tradi-
tion. 63 One might say that Roosevelt's decision was comparable
to Pollock, an aberration that was inconsistent with the broad evolu-
tionary course of constitutional history; the amendment merely re-
stored a preexisting tradition and may even have been unnecessary,
because the tradition might have reasserted itself without an amend-
ment.
This account of the Twenty-second Amendment is plausible, but in
fact the Twenty-second Amendment may be an occasion on which it
really mattered that there was a process for formally amending the
Constitution. To begin with, the Twenty-second Amendment did not
simply establish a rule of the road: the precise length of a term may be
a rule of the road, but a limit on the number of terms is an important
substantive rule. In particular, a presidential term limit can have sig-
nificant effects on politics even if no President ever actually seeks a
third term, because it makes a reelected President a lame duck
throughout his second term.
In the case of the Twenty-second Amendment, the three conditions
that can potentially make amendments significant all coalesced. First,
unlike slavery or the poll tax, for example, presidential term limits may
not have been a subject on which the nation had reached closure. The
amendment did pass with substantial support and relatively little pub-
lic controversy, but it arguably was adopted at a high-water mark of
anti-Roosevelt and anti-Truman sentiment. 164 The adoption of the
Twenty-second Amendment was in some ways a highly partisan act,
supported by Republicans (virtually unanimously) and by Southern
Democrats (many of whom opposed the New Deal and the early civil
rights initiatives of President Roosevelt's successor), but bitterly op-
posed by many supporters of the New Deal. 165 Popular sentiment
about presidential term limits was, therefore, one-sided enough to
make a constitutional amendment possible, but it did not remain one-
163 For an argument that the "tradition" was not in fact well established, see Bruce G. Peabody
& Scott E. Gant, The Twice and Future President: Constitutional Interstices and the Twenty-
second Amendment, 83 MINN. L. REV. 565, 574-84 (1999).
164 On the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Twenty-second Amendment, see gen-
erally Stephen W. Stathis, The Twenty-second Amendment: A Practical Remedy or Partisan Ma-
neuver?, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 61 (i99o).
165 See JAMES W. DAVIS, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 406 (2d ed. 1995); LOUIS W. KOENIG,
THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE 66 (1964); Peabody & Gant, supra note 163, at 570, 598-99. Only ten
House Democrats from states outside the old Confederacy voted for the proposed amendment, and
only two were urban liberals. One of those two was the newly elected John F. Kennedy of Massa-
chusetts, whose father had become a virulent opponent of Roosevelt. KYVIG, supra note 9, at 331.
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sided. Presidents Eisenhower, Nixon, and Reagan all, at some point,
criticized the Twenty-second Amendment 166 - suggesting that the
Amendment was adopted as public opinion crested and that public
opinion may have since receded, leaving the Amendment in place.
This condition alone, however, is not enough to establish that the
formal amendment mattered. The Fifteenth Amendment, for example,
was also adopted at a high-water mark of public sentiment, and
popular support for it likewise receded. When an amendment is
adopted in such circumstances, one would expect it to be evaded, as
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were. The Twenty-second
Amendment's specificity makes it hard to evade - the second charac-
teristic that makes it an arguable exception to the proposition that
constitutional amendments do not matter. A term-limit amendment
that is carefully drafted, with precise numerical specifications, should
be nearly evasion-proof, unlike such relatively vague provisions as the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or the
provision forbidding disenfranchisement "on account of" race or previ-
ous condition of servitude.
The third characteristic that makes the Twenty-second Amendment
an arguable exception to the rule of unimportance is that it addresses a
subject on which the other branches of government are not likely to
speak authoritatively. Often the reason the formal amendment process
does not matter is that some combination of legislative action and ju-
dicial interpretation of the Constitution can produce the same outcome
without an amendment. It is essentially inconceivable, however, that
the Supreme Court would have announced a two-term presidential
limit without a constitutional amendment. 167 The problem is not that
the two-term tradition was insufficiently well established. In other
contexts the courts would have little hesitation in enforcing a tradition
with such deep roots, even if it had no specific textual basis. But a
presidential term limit presents such sensitive separation-of-powers is-
sues that the courts could not possibly have enforced a limit that was
based on tradition alone. In fact, it is not clear that the Supreme
166 See Peabody & Gant, supra note 163, at 602-10. Presidents Eisenhower and Reagan did
subsequently disavow any interest in running for a third term, id. at 602-03, 607-o9, and of course
President Nixon never finished his second. See also Jann S. Wenner, Bill Clinton: The Rolling
Stone Interview, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 28, 2ooo-Jan. 4, 2001, at 84, 88-89 (quoting President
Clinton as saying that he "probably would have run again" were it not for the Twenty-second
Amendment and expressing support for a change from a lifetime term limit to a consecutive term
limit).
167 Cf. Peabody & Gant, supra note 163, at 6ii n.2 I I ("Although a fair number of judicial opin-
ions refer to the Twenty-second Amendment or describe it in passing, we could not find a single
reported decision truly 'interpreting' the Amendment - by which we mean deciding a case or con-
troversy in a way that turns on divining the meaning of the Amendment and determining its ef-
fects.").
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Court would invalidate the election of a candidate to a third term even
now, with the Amendment on the books; the Court might regard the
validity of the election as a kind of political question, to be determined
through the electoral process. 168 Nor would the courts be likely to al-
low Congress to make the two-term limit binding through legislation,
again because the threat to the separation of powers is too great. Thus
the three conditions needed to make the formal amendment process
significant - the adoption of the Amendment at a high-water mark
from which popular sentiment subsequently receded, the difficulty of
evasion, and the fact that the other branches are out of the picture -
were all present in this case to a substantial degree. Combined, they
suggest that the Twenty-second Amendment is an exception to the
generalization that the formal amendment process does not matter.
In a sense, however, this exception helps establish the general rule:
it takes an unusual set of conditions to make the formal amendment
process an important means of constitutional change. All three of
these conditions must come together; otherwise an amendment will ei-
ther be evaded, ratify an understanding that would have held anyway,
or do work that the courts and Congress would have done in the ab-
sence of an amendment. Only rarely will all of these circumstances
occur at once.
In fact, it is possible that even the Twenty-second Amendment
made less of a difference than one might think. Despite appearances,
term-limit provisions are not impossible to evade. The incumbent's
spouse, or a crony, can seek election, with the understanding that the
incumbent will continue to exercise power behind the scenes. Term-
limited state governors have used this tactic.1 69  In fact - as if to
demonstrate just how hard it is to draft an evasion-proof provision of
any kind - the Twenty-second Amendment actually provides that
"[n]o person shall be elected to the office of the President more than
twice,"170 leaving open the possibility that a term-limited President
could hold the office again if he were elected Vice President and then
168 It is true that, in Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000), the Court's decision may well have de-
termined the outcome of the election, and the legal basis of the Court's decision was not uncontro-
versial (to say the least). If the Court were to enforce the Twenty-second Amendment against a
President who sought to run for a third term, it would have explicit textual support for its decision.
But the presidential election of 2ooo did not have a clear winner. For the Court to enforce the
Twenty-second Amendment and bar the clear winner of the election from assuming office would
be, in that respect at least, far more of an intervention in the political process than Bush v. Gore
was.
169 Perhaps the most famous example occurred in 1966, when Lurleen Wallace succeeded her
husband, the notorious segregationist George Wallace, as governor of Alabama. Lurleen Wallace
ran for the office after her husband failed to obtain the repeal of a state constitutional provision
limiting the governor to a single consecutive term. See STEPHAN LESHER, GEORGE WALLACE:
AMERICAN POPULIST 352-70 (g994).
170 U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § i (emphasis added).
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succeeded to the presidency, or if he were appointed Vice President
under the provisions of the Twenty-fifth Amendment and then suc-
ceeded to the office without being elected, as President Ford did. 7 '
The absence of any serious effort to evade the Twenty-second
Amendment may simply indicate that such maneuvers would be an
obvious sham, but it may also suggest that the barriers to a third
presidential term are stronger than just the constitutional provision it-
self. "Time for a change" is a powerful electoral appeal, and it is not
clear that any post-Roosevelt President could have won a third term.
Moreover, the lame-duck effect that a term-limited President suffers is
mitigated by the fact that a Vice President or other close political ally
will often be a leading candidate to succeed the incumbent. The
Twenty-second Amendment makes the two-term tradition more diffi-
cult to evade and probably impossible to defy outright. But all in all,
the lesson of the Twenty-second Amendment is that the circumstances
in which an amendment is likely to make a difference coalesce infre-
quently, and that even then the amendment's impact may be less than
one might have originally thought.
B. The Direct Election of Senators
The Seventeenth Amendment requires the direct popular election
of Senators - the Constitution originally specified that state legisla-
tures elect Senators - and the direct election of Senators may have
been a significant change in the nation's constitutional order. But once
again, it would be a mistake to say that the Seventeenth Amendment
was responsible for this change. The change occurred, for all practical
purposes, before the Amendment was adopted; the effect of the
Amendment was to ratify a change that had already taken place. At
most, the Amendment served to mop up outliers that were few in
number and would probably have fallen into line before long.
The direct election of Senators developed in stages, beginning as
early as the 183Os. Until that time, candidates for the Senate typically
did not campaign in any significant way until the state legislature was
elected; then they campaigned among members of the new legislature.
Beginning in the 183os, however, aspiring Senators began appealing
directly to the electorate to vote for state legislative candidates who
were pledged to support them for the Senate.' 7 2 The famous debates
about slavery between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas in 1858
dramatized this development; 7 3 those debates took place before the
171 These various possibilities are considered at length in Peabody & Gant, supra note 163, at
567-70, 611-33.
172 See William H. Riker, The Senate and American Federalism, 49 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 452,
463-64 (955).
173 See id. at 464.
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general public, not the state legislature, even though Lincoln and
Douglas were campaigning for the Senate. Not only did Lincoln and
Douglas appeal directly to the electorate as a whole, but in that elec-
tion the state parties endorsed their respective candidates for Senate
before the state legislative elections took place. This pledged each
party's state legislative candidates to the party's Senate candidate.
1 74
In effect the election of Senators resembled the election of a prime
minister in a parliamentary system.
The Lincoln-Douglas election was atypical in the degree to which
the candidates appealed directly to citizens, but support for direct elec-
tion increased greatly in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
Members of Congress proposed several constitutional amendments
providing for direct election during this period. 75  Meanwhile, state
governments, responding to popular sentiment in favor of direct elec-
tion, instituted measures designed to bring about direct election in fact
even if not in name. Beginning in 1875, Nebraska held a primary elec-
tion to choose parties' candidates for the Senate. Other states followed
suit, and in one-party states (notably in the South), victory in the
dominant party's primary election became tantamount to election to
the Senate. Those one-party states, then, had effectively instituted di-
rect election well before the Seventeenth Amendment was even pro-
posed. 17
6
In 1904, Oregon took the next step by requiring candidates for the
state legislature to include a statement on their nominating petitions
either "solemnly pledg[ing]" to vote for the Senate candidate who re-
ceived the most popular votes or declaring themselves free "wholly [to]
disregard" the popular vote.' 77 Not surprisingly, nearly all state legis-
lative candidates took the pledge. In i9o9, an Oregon state legislature
with a Republican majority elected a Democratic Senator who had
won the popular election, establishing that direct election existed in all
but name.' 78
By 1911, a year before the Seventeenth Amendment was proposed,
over half the states had adopted the Oregon system or something like
it; in many states, the ballot for state legislative elections stated
whether a candidate pledged to support the winner of the popular
174 See GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE ELECTION OF SENATORS 133 (96); Riker, supra note 172,
at 464.
175 See i GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY AND PRAC-
TICE 97-98 (Russell & Russell, Inc. ig6o) (1938).
176 See id. at 99-104.
177 Id. at ioi. On modern efforts to promote term limit proposals in a similar way, see Gralike v.
Cook, 191 F.3 d 9II, 914-15 & n.3 (i999), cert. granted, i2o S. Ct. 1669 (2ooo); and Elizabeth
Garrett, The Law and Economics of "Informed Voter" Ballot Notations, 85 VA. L. REV. '533
(1999).
178 1 HAYNES, supra note 175, at 102-03.
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election for the Senate. At least three state constitutions explicitly re-
quired state legislators to elect the Senate candidate who received the
most votes in the primary.179 And the following exchange occurred on
the floor of the Senate between Senators Albert Cummins of Iowa,
who favored the Seventeenth Amendment, and Weldon Heyburn of
Idaho, a rock-ribbed opponent:
Mr. CUMMINS. [T]he Senator from Idaho is insisting ... that if the vot-
ers of the United States be permitted to say who shall be their Senators,
then this body will be overrun by a crowd of incompetent and unfit and
rash and socialistic and radical men who have no proper views of gov-
ernment. I am simply recalling to his attention the fact that the people of
this country, in despair of amending the Constitution, have accomplished
this reform for themselves.
Mr. HEYBURN. Like a burglar.
Mr. CUMMINS. In an irregular way, I agree, but they have accomplished
it.
Mr. HEYBURN. Like a burglar.
Mr. CUMMINS. And they have accomplished it so effectively that,
whether the Constitution is amended or not, the people in many or most of
the States will choose their own Senators.1 8 0
The Seventeenth Amendment, therefore, did not bring about the direct
election of Senators; it ratified an already existing practice of de facto
direct election.
It is true that the Seventeenth Amendment made this practice uni-
form before it otherwise would have become uniform. It prevented
states from reversing themselves and returning to a more indirect form
of election, although there appear to be no instances in which a state
tried to do so before the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment.
The Amendment also eliminated any missteps that might have oc-
curred in the states' makeshift forms of direct elections. The formal
amendment process does serve these functions. But again the princi-
pal forces bringing about the direct election of Senators lay elsewhere,
and they were on their way to prevailing, one way or another, with or
without a formal constitutional amendment. 181
179 On these various devices and those mentioned above, see, for example, ALAN P. GRIMES,
DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 76 (1978); HAYNES, supra note
174, at 130-52; i HAYNES, supra note 175, at 99-104; KYVIG, supra note 9, at 210-Ii; and Ronald
D. Rotunda, The Aftermath of Thornton, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 201, 207-09 (1996).
180 47 CONG. REC. 1743 (I911), quoted in Riker, supra note 172, at 467.
181 This conclusion - that the Seventeenth Amendment served primarily to ratify a change that
had already occurred - has been reached by many other commentators. See, e.g., Riker, supra
note 172, at 468 ("[T]he Seventeenth Amendment thus simply acknowledged an already existing
situation .... ); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Feder-
alism, ioo COLUM. L. REv. 215, 224 n.33 (2000) ("Ratification of the 17th Amendment merely
completed and made nationally uniform a process that had been underway for more than a cen-
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In a way it should not be surprising that the direct election of Sena-
tors was effectively implemented without a formal amendment. The
Constitution envisions that presidents will be elected indirectly, by the
electoral college. Nominally, they still are; but in reality they are
elected directly, on a state-by-state basis. A direct election amendment
- specifying that each state's electoral vote total would be cast auto-
matically for the popular vote winner, with no intercession by the elec-
tors' judgment - would have no effect on the outcome of presidential
elections. 8 2  State law brought about this change from indirect to di-
rect election of the President, 183 and there is every reason to think that
the indirect election of Senators would have suffered the same fate,
even without the Seventeenth Amendment.
18 4
C. Women's Suffrage (With an Aside on Flag Desecration)
The enfranchisement of women was not the first major change in
the composition of the American electorate, even leaving aside the Fif-
teenth Amendment. Before the Revolution, all of the colonies limited
the franchise to property owners.18 5  Although some colonies had re-
duced or eliminated their property qualifications by the time of the
Revolution, many had not. 18 6 Then, in several waves of reform in the
tury."); Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural Examination of the
Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1347, 1354-55 (1996) ("I think it fair to say that even
without ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, direct election would be with us today in most
if not all States. In reality then, the Seventeenth Amendment was a formalizing final step in an
evolutionary process." (footnotes omitted)); see also HAYNES, supra note 174, at 133.
182 Direct election should be distinguished from the other prominent feature of the electoral col-
lege, its winner-take-all character within each state. An amendment providing for election by a
nationwide popular plurality would have a significant effect on campaign tactics and would alter
outcomes. But that is a change in how votes are aggregated, which is different from direct election.
Simply providing for direct election - in the sense that each state's electoral votes would be
counted automatically, so no one except the voters at large would exercise any discretion over who
is elected - would not change the current system significantly (at least if one leaves aside truly
extraordinary events like those that occurred in Florida in 2ooo).
183 The Supreme Court subsequently upheld these state laws regarding presidential election,
arguably subverting the original constitutional design. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 2 14, 231 (1952).
This decision is roundly criticized in DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME
COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986, at 371 (1990).
184 See i HAYNES, supra note 175, at 98-99. Todd Zywicki has forcefully urged a contrary view.
See Todd J. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell and Husk of History: The History of the Seventeenth
Amendment and Its Implications for Current Reform Proposals, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 165, 201-19
(1997) (arguing that the Seventeenth Amendment was the product of interest group activity); id. at
192-93 (identifying differences between the Seventeenth Amendment and the state-by-state provi-
sions for direct election that preceded it).
185 E.g., Christopher Collier, The American People as Christian White Men of Property: Suffrage
and Elections in Colonial and Early National America, in VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 19, 22-23 (Donald W. Rogers ed., 1992).
186 See ADAMS, supra note i, at 293-307 (detailing various states' property qualifications before
and after the Revolution). A few states, including Massachusetts, actually made property qualifi-
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first decades of the nineteenth century, the states began eliminating
property qualifications and adopting what was called "universal" suf-
frage (although it was limited to white males).18 7 Many of these
changes occurred in state constitutional conventions; others came
about through legislation. 188 By 1840, property qualifications were no
longer significant, and by i86o, they no longer existed anywhere.8 9
The abolition of property qualifications is arguably another change
of constitutional magnitude that occurred without a formal amend-
ment. The Supreme Court did eventually ratify this change; beginning
in the I96os, the Court, following the "one person, one vote" principle,
held that property qualifications are unconstitutional except in elec-
tions to bodies that deal exclusively with matters of special importance
to the property owners who are authorized to vote. 190 But by the time
of those decisions, the basic principle of universal suffrage was already
deeply entrenched. The Supreme Court's decisions in this area (like all
of its "one person, one vote" decisions) relied on the Equal Protection
Clause of Section i of the Fourteenth Amendment - even though
there are strong arguments that Section i was never intended to limit
the states' power over the franchise. 19 1 The Supreme Court's deci-
sions defining the very limited circumstances in which property quali-
fications are permissible can be seen, therefore, as interpretations of
the nontextual "amendment" that brought about so-called universal
suffrage.
The rejection of property qualifications without a formal amend-
ment suggests that there is less to the Nineteenth Amendment than
meets the eye, just as the advent of the direct election of the President
without a formal amendment suggests that the significance of the Sev-
enteenth Amendment is easy to overstate. The Nineteenth Amend-
ment was, of course, the product of a decades-long struggle for
women's suffrage, in which the proponents sought to achieve their ob-
cations more stringent. Sean Wilentz, Property and Power: Suffrage Reform in the United States,
1787-i86o, in VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 185, at 3', 33.
187 See CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE: FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY,
176O-I86O, at 156-57, 18i, 204-05 (196o); Wilentz, supra note i86, at 33.
188 See DEMOCRACY, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY: THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS
OF THE 1820'S (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1966); ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM
52 (1998).
189 FONER, supra note 188, at 52.
190 See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 362-71 (i98i); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 726-30 (1973); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 207-13
(1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704-06 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist.,
395 U.S. 62 1, 630-33 (1969).
191 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 590-608 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); AMAR, supra note
22, at 216-17 & n.* (citing many sources). For a contrary view, see William W. Van Alstyne, The
Fourteenth Amendment, the "Right" to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress,
1965 SUP. CT. REV. 33, 38-85.
1500 [Vol. I114:1457
HeinOnline  -- 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1500 2000-2001
2001] THE IRRELEVANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
jective both at the state level and by means of a constitutional
amendment. At first, their principal emphasis was on the states. 192 A
women's suffrage amendment to the federal Constitution was intro-
duced in Congress in i868, and then repeatedly in subsequent Con-
gresses, but it never came close to passage. 93 It received some atten-
tion from Congress until 1896, at which point it "virtually disappeared
from the Congressional agenda and from public notice until i913.'
194
During this period, suffragists had limited success at the state level.
By 1913 women had full suffrage in only nine states. At that point
suffrage supporters divided over whether to continue to seek changes
at the state level or to concentrate on a federal constitutional amend-
ment.19 5  But around the same time, the current began to run more
strongly in favor of women's suffrage. In 1916, both major parties'
platforms endorsed women's suffrage "state by state."1 96 Charles Ev-
ans Hughes, the Republican candidate for President, went beyond his
party's platform to endorse a federal constitutional amendment. 197
President Wilson, who had initially opposed women's suffrage entirely
and then said he thought it should be implemented by the states rather
than by the federal Constitution, indicated for the first time during the
1916 presidential campaign that he would support a constitutional
amendment. 198 In 1918 the House of Representatives, for the first
time, voted in favor of the amendment by a two-thirds majority, but
the Senate - after a debate in which "states' rights" was a recurrent
theme - narrowly rejected it.' 19 In i919, the House again voted for
the amendment - this time by a substantially larger margin - and
192 See ELEANOR FLEXNER & ELLEN FITZPATRICK, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN'S
RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 157-58 (enlarged ed. i996) 0959). Between 1867
and 1920, suffragists initiated, by one count, 480 campaigns directed at state legislatures. See
AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, I89O-I92o, at 3-4
(Anchor Books 1971) (1965); see also DAVID MORGAN, SUFFRAGISTS AND DEMOCRATS (1972);
ANNE F. SCOTT & ANDREW M. SCOTT, ONE HALF THE PEOPLE: THE FIGHT FOR WOMAN SUF-
FRAGE 14-23 (1975) (describing the organization of women for suffrage rights).
193 FLEXNER & FITZPATRICK, supra note 192, at 165-67.
194 Id. at 167.
195 See id. at 265-67.
196 Id. at 270-71 & nn.5-6 (quoting the Democratic Party platform, as reported in The New York
Times).
197 Christine A. Lunardini & Thomas J. Knock, Woodrow Wilson and Woman Suffrage: A New
Look, 95 POL. SC. Q. 655, 66i (I98O).
198 In 1915, Wilson announced that he would vote in favor of women's suffrage in a referendum
in his home state of New Jersey, although he added: "I believe that it should be settled by the State
and not by the National Government .... I Id. at 66o. Then, during the 1916 campaign, in a
speech before a suffragist group, Wilson endorsed suffrage and added, "[W]e shall not quarrel in
the long run as to the method of it," a remark that was taken to show that Wilson would not insist
on proceeding state by state but would support the federal constitutional amendment. Id. at 662.
199 FLEXNER & FITZPATRICK, supra note 192, at 283, 303-04.
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the Senate concurred. The amendment was ratified in i92o, after sev-
eral dramatic moments in state legislatures. °°
On the one hand, this history suggests that the availability of a
formal amendment process was much more significant for women's
suffrage than for the direct election of Senators or even for the income
tax. The Nineteenth Amendment did not simply ratify a fait accompli
as the Seventeenth Amendment did. The suffragists had relatively lit-
tle success at the state level; the federal amendment process provided
them a more hospitable arena. The amendment process nationalized
the women's suffrage debate, and that may have been crucial. The
national political parties were competing for current and future
women voters nationwide and could not afford to ignore the suffrage
issue. By contrast, in states where women did not have the right to
vote, the parties had less incentive to favor suffrage; this was particu-
larly true in one-party states, such as those of the solidly Democratic
South, which was the strongest bastion of opposition to women's suf-
frage. While the national parties could influence the states, they were
presumably more effective at the federal level. Wilson lobbied vigor-
ously for the Amendment in 1917 and 1918,201 and he too would pre-
sumably have been less influential if the campaign for the Amendment
had been conducted entirely at the state level, although he apparently
helped secure some state ratifications of the Amendment.10 2
On the other hand, the amendment process is not a national refer-
endum;20 3 it requires the independent assent of three-quarters of the
states, and three-quarters of the states did ratify the Nineteenth
Amendment. This suggests that a state-by-state campaign for
women's suffrage might also have succeeded. A state ratification can-
not necessarily be equated to a state's decision to adopt women's suf-
frage on its own - the latter might have required a supermajority or
referendum, and enormous resources were concentrated on the mar-
ginal states in the ratification process. Still, the forces that led to the
shift in opinion in favor of a constitutional amendment also changed
the climate of opinion at the state level. During the period from 1916
to I919, several states enfranchised women for some or all elections.20 4
This happened even though, by then, most of the suffragists' efforts
were directed toward Washington, D.C. With both major political
parties strongly supporting women's suffrage and the President play-
ing an active role even at the state level, it seems unlikely that many
states would have held out much longer. The Nineteenth Amendment
200 Id. at 308-17.
201 Lunardini & Knock, supra note 197, at 664-68.
202 See id. at 669-70.
203 This point is emphasized in Monaghan, supra note 17, at 121-22.
204 FLEXNER & FITZPATRICK, supra note 192, at 304-07.
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certainly suppressed outliers; it made women's suffrage uniform before
it otherwise would have been. Beyond that, probably the best estimate
is that if the suffragists had been forced to concentrate solely on the
state level, they would have achieved substantial but not complete suc-
cess within a few years.
The Nineteenth Amendment is revealing in other ways about the
limited role of the formal amendment process in bringing about consti-
tutional change. A naive reader of the text of the Constitution would
think that racial minorities have voted since 187o and that women
have voted since 192o. That is true of women - there is no evidence
of systematic subversion of the Nineteenth Amendment - but em-
phatically untrue of African-Americans. By 192o, American society
really had changed to the point that it was willing to accept (and even
insist on) women's suffrage. In 1870, society had not reached that
point for African-Americans, and the Fifteenth Amendment could not
securely enfranchise them. It is, therefore, not always or trivially true
that any constellation of political forces powerful enough to bring
about a constitutional amendment is powerful enough to change soci-
ety. Sometimes amendments ratify a permanent shift in the political
culture; sometimes they do not. The lack of resistance to the enforce-
ment of the Nineteenth Amendment reveals that it fell into the former
category. But in either event, what controls the pace of change is the
culture, not the amendment.
This contrast between the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments
also sheds light on the recently proposed amendment to ban flag dese-
cration. Opponents of the amendment sometimes paint a dramatic
picture, suggesting that any such amendment would be a serious in-
cursion on the First Amendment that might undermine our system of
freedom of expression.2 0 5 The amendment might have that effect - or
it might not. It is possible that a flag desecration amendment would
be interpreted narrowly, as allowing the government to ban flag dese-
cration but not substantially affecting the law governing freedom of
expression. In that case, the effect of the amendment would be minor.
(Its principal effect would surely be to increase the amount of public
flag desecration, because flag desecration becomes a much more attrac-
tive means of protest when it is illegal.2 0 6)
Alternatively, a flag desecration amendment might be interpreted to
give the government general authority to develop a conception of
secular blasphemy - that is, to make it a crime to treat various na-
tional symbols disrespectfully. In that case the effects of a flag dese-
205 See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. S18,256-57 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 1995) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
206 See Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 765, 765-66 (r98).
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cration amendment would indeed be substantial. It is difficult to say
which of these two scenarios would occur if the amendment were
adopted; that would be determined by a complex array of forces that
influence legislative and judicial action and public opinion. The
amendment might be interpreted one way at first and another way af-
ter a few decades. And even a rejected flag desecration amendment
might have the same fate as the rejected ERA: courts might allow the
government to develop a secular equivalent of blasphemy laws without
an amendment. In any event, if our experience with constitutional
amendments is a guide, the adoption of the amendment is itself un-
likely to be the crucial event in resolving these larger questions.
Finally, the events leading up to the Nineteenth Amendment reveal
the tenuousness of the argument that the text of the Constitution
should be read as an integrated whole, so that, for example, the Nine-
teenth Amendment read in conjunction with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment would support a principle forbidding gender discrimination that
would otherwise be harder to justify.20 7 It is just a fortuity that there
is a women's suffrage amendment: seeking a constitutional amendment
just happened to be, in the specific political context of the time, the
suffragists' best strategy. If political conditions had been more favor-
able in the states and women's suffrage had achieved an encouraging
series of victories at the state level, as "universal suffrage" did in the
early nineteenth century, the suffragists presumably would not have
invested effort in trying to obtain a constitutional amendment.
It seems odd to say that if women's suffrage had fared better at the
state level and the Nineteenth Amendment had never been needed, we
would have less reason today for interpreting the Constitution to re-
quire gender equality. The nation's commitment to women's suffrage
would have been just as profound and, arguably, just as appropriate
an influence on the interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause if the
states had adopted suffrage without the compulsion of the federal
Constitution. The idea that that commitment should influence the in-
terpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment is certainly plausible. But
to assert that that commitment should influence the interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment only because it happens to be enshrined in
a constitutional amendment of its own, rather than in state and local
laws, is to misunderstand the way our system changes and to attach
too much importance to a contingency.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is great appeal to the idea that the written Constitution is
the authentic voice of the People on matters of fundamental principle.
207 See sources cited supra note 20.
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But however true this idea was for the original Constitution and its
early amendments, it presents a misleading picture of the constitu-
tional development of the mature Republic. The fundamental changes
in the constitutional order have occurred by means other than the
amendment process. They have occurred without amendments, de-
spite the rejection of amendments, or in ways that made amendments
only incidentally important.
Formal amendments do help to settle matters that have to be set-
tled one way or another. In addition, formal amendments serve the
function of mopping up pockets of resistance to a national consensus,
making what otherwise would be merely a dominant rule into the uni-
versal rule. But except for these two limited functions - which the
system might have found other ways to accomplish even in the absence
of a formal amendment process - our constitutional order would look
little different if a formal amendment process did not exist.
This does not mean, however, that the constitution - the small-"c"
constitution, properly understood - does not reflect the will of the
people. It just means that the constitution, in practice, includes not
just the text of the document, but also the settled understandings that
have developed alongside the text. The people rule not through dis-
crete, climactic, political acts like formal constitutional amendments,
but in a different way - often simply through the way they run their
nonpolitical lives, sometimes combined with sustained political activity
spread over a generation or more. The ERA was rejected in the for-
mal amendment process but was ratified in effect by women entering
the workforce, running for political office, and seeking jobs once closed
to them, as well as by the political and legal campaigns that paralleled
those developments. The Fifteenth Amendment, formally adopted a
century earlier, finally became a real part of the Constitution in the
mid-i96os, as a result of more than a generation's worth of both politi-
cal activity and economic and demographic change that supported that
activity.
These are forms of popular rule that are less romantic than the idea
of the People speaking with one voice to amend the Constitution. And
these forms of popular rule may be less congenial to lawyers because
they do not provide a canonical text to be scrutinized and interpreted.
But they represent a deep and true form of popular rule in a mature
republic.
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